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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the twentieth century, the income tax evolved as the 
principal source of revenue for the federal government.1 In the 
early 1970s, however, academic writers began to reexamine the 
desirability of an income tax.2 More recently, the income tax has 
come under attack from legislators3 and commentators, 4 who have 
proposed alternative tax systems. As a result, it appears that 
fundamental tax reform is more likely now than at any other time 
in the history of the modern income tax. 
This article discusses the movement toward an economy in 
which virtually all transactions of significant size are done 
electro~cally, either through credit cards; electronic bank 
transfers, or electronic commerce ("e-commerce"). Indeed, 
observation of our current economy reveals that the economy is 
close to that point already,5 with paper currency relegated only to 
minor transactions or illegal commerce. This movement, brought 
about through technological change in electronic funds transfers 
1 See, e.g. FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POUClES 7-9 (Michael J. Graetz 
& Deborah H. Schenk, eds., 3d Ed. 1995). 
• See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 
HARv. L. REV. 1113 (1974). 
• See, e.g. Senator Pete V. Domenici, The Unamerican Spirit of the Federal Income Tax, 
31 HARv. J. ON LEGIS.273 (1994); Congressman Bill Archer, Goals of Fundamental Tax 
ReforminFRONTIERSOFTAXREFORM(MichaelJ. Boskin,ed.1996); H.R. 2060, 104thCong., 
1'' Sess. (1995) (Flat tax proposal introduced by Representative Anney and Senator Shelby); 
S. 722, 1041h Cong., 1" Sess. (1995) (Direct consumption USA tax proposal by Senators 
Nunn, Domenici, & Kerrey). See also infra, notes 91-115 and accompanying text. 
• See RoBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX, (2"" Ed. 1995); MICHAEL J. 
GRAETZ, THE DECUNE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX (1997); FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 
(MichaelJ. Boskin ed. 1996); JOELSLEMROD&JONBAKIJA, TAXINGOURSELVES:ACITIZEN'S 
GUIDE TO THE GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM (1998); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE U.S. 
INCOME TAX (1999). 
0 See, e.g. EUNOR HARRIS SOLOMON, VIRTUAL MONEY 6-7 (1997) (Describing the 
movement away from paper currency toward electronic money transfers and other credit 
transactions); Shahriar Tavakol, Digital Value Units, Electronic Commerce and 
International Trade: An Obituary for State Sovereignty Over National Markets, 17 J. 
MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER& INFO. L. 1197, 1197 (1999) (describing the evolution of banking 
from paper currency to "e-commerce"); Heather C. Alston, Will that be Cash, Credit, or E-
money? 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 225, 225 (1997) (describing the replacement of paper 
currency with credit cards and "e-money"); Thomas P. Vartanian, Doing Business on the 
Internet: The Law of Electronic Commerce, 452 PLIIPAT 141, 146 (1996) ("the business of 
fmancial intermediation may be heading for the most comprehensive overhaul of products 
and delivery systems this century"). 
HeinOnline -- 20 Va. Tax Rev. 4 2000-2001
4 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 20:1 
and credit card transactions, has made point-of-sale taxation 
feasible and inexpensive. As a result, this article recommends that 
the income tax should be replaced by a system of taxation that 
imposes and assesses the tax on transactions at the point-of-sale. 
A point-of-sale system of taxation is most efficiently implemented 
as a credit-type value-added tax ("VAT"), and this article 
recommends the credit-type VAT as the primary model that should 
be adopted in the future to take full advantage of the new 
technology. Optimally, this model should replace the current 
income tax in its entirety because it can raise the revenues now 
being collected under the income tax less expensively. A retail 
sales tax could also be implemented in the manner suggested in 
this article. · 
Part II of this article examines the movement towards a 
currency-free economy. Part III reviews the theoretical concepts 
of tax incidence, discussing both the difference between legal and 
economic incidence, and efficient taxation in order to explain the 
difficulty of determining who actually bears the burden of taxes 
and which taxes are economically most efficient. Thereafter, Part 
IV analyzes the current personal income tax system using the 
economics principles developed in Part II.· Part V examines the 
dead-weight loss that results from the current personal income tax 
system. Part VI discusses alternative tax systems as possible 
replacements for the personal income tax and, in particular, 
reviews several consumption tax reform proposals based on the 
economics principles developed in Part III. The review in Part VI 
is intended to explain the difficulty of comparing burden-sharing 
among competing tax systems and of comparing their relative 
efficiency. 
Part VII recognizes the impact of technological developments 
in electronic commerce on the government's ability to assess and 
collect taxes effectively and efficiently at the point-of-sale and with 
minimal dead weight loss and proposes a point-of-sale tax system 
in the form of a value added tax with mechanisms for the 
automatic and electronic collection of the tax. The proposed 
system is explained and evaluated, particularly in light of the 
criteria normally used by advocates of the income tax, especially 
progressivity. 
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II. THE MOVEMENT TO A CURRENCY-FREE ECONO~ 
Major financial transactions have been accomplished 
electronically for several years.7 Today, electronic consumer 
transactions eclipse cash transactions in sheer dollar value, 
although cash payments still constitute the vast majority of 
transactions.8 Consumer transactions extend from department 
store transactions, which have used credit cards for many years, 
to grocery store transactions, and most recently, purchases of 
gasoline and toll road collections. For many middle-class 
individuals, cash transactions have become the exception rather 
than the norm.9 For many, cash is only used for small incidental 
purchases.10 
Electronic funds transfers ("EFTs") among financial 
institutions have a long history, dating back to the 1950s and 
1960s, and are now increasingly replacing paper checks.11 Large 
electronic funds transfers to individuals through direct deposit are 
now quite commonplace. For example, for several years, 
employees of even moderate size companies, as a rule have been 
receiving salary payments through direct deposit. 12 More recently, 
the government has been dispersing transfer payments 
electronically as well. For example, Social Security retirement 
payments are no longer made by check but rather are 
• See John D. Muller,Selected Developments in the Law of Cyberspace Payments, 54 Bus. 
LAw. 403 (1999) for a discussion of recent developments in e-commerce and electronic fund 
transfers, some of which is summarized in this part. See also Vartanian, supra note 5, at 
145-48. 
• The history of this movement from cash to electronic payment is chronicled in 
SOLOMON, supra note 5, at 26-32, 41-42. 
• See id. at 39-40. 
• See, e.g. Randall W. Sifers, Regulating Electronic Money in Small-value Payment 
Systems: Telecommunications Law as a Regulatory Model, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 701, 703 
(noting that most cash expenditures are now primarily made for "small-value cash 
transactions"). 
•• See id. 
" See SOLOMON, supra note 5, at 26. 
12 See, e.g. SIFERS, supra note 9, at 705 (noting the use of electronic payment systems 
has been at first exclusively the domain of larger institutions; however with advanced 
technology, even small businesses can afford to utilize such payment systems). 
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accomplished by crediting recipients' accounts directly. 13 Welfare 
payments and food stamps are also dispersed through electronic 
benefits transfers ("EBTs") directly onto "smart" cards. 14 It follows 
that payments from these accounts will also be largely electronic. 15 
Even electronic income tax refunds, at the urging of the Internal 
Revenue Service ("Service"), are becoming more commonplace. 16 
Consumer credit and debit card transactions have evolved 
more recently than electronic funds transfers, beginning originally 
as a "retail" phenomenon.17 Under a credit card arrangement, the 
bank member of the credit card system that issues the card agrees 
to provide a line of credit to the cardholder.18 This line of credit 
can be used at any member retail establishment.19 When the card 
is used to make a retail purchase, the merchant submits, 
electronically, the charge draft to the merchant's bank, which is a 
member bank agent, and receives the amount of the draft less a 
merchant discount (generally based on a percentage of the gross 
amount of the draft) to compensate the merchant's bank. 2° For 
example, if the customer charge is $100, the merchant may receive 
$98 from its bank. 21 The merchant's bank, in turn, submits the 
charge draft to the cardholder's card-issuing bank and receives the 
amount of the draft less a fee or discount of perhaps $1.22 The 
cardholder's bank then bills the cardholder for the full amount of 
the draft. Thus, on a $100 charge, which is ultimately paid in full 
by the cardholder, the merchant may receive $98; the merchant's 
bank may receive $99 but pay out $98 to the merchant, retaining 
$1, and the cardholder's bank may receive $100, paying out $99 to 
•• See Peter P. Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government 
Surveillance, 77WASH. U.L.Q. 461,469 (1999) (discussing electronic government benefits, 
including social security and welfare). 
" See id. See also SOWMON, supra note 5, at 79-82. 
10 See SOWMON, supra note 5, at 81 (purchases with a smart card resulting in a credit 
to the vendor's account). 
10 See for example I.R.S. Tax Form 1040EZ. 
17 See SOWMON, supra note 5, at 30-31. 
10 See id. at 54. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 See id. at 56. 
22 Id. 
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the merchant's bank and retaining $1.23 Moreover, if the 
cardholder does not pay the bill timely, interest accrues on the 
outstanding balance. 24 
Debit cards, or automated teller machine ("ATM") cards, in 
contrast, are grounded in cash rather than credit transactions. 25 
The cardholder who uses a debit card at a merchant's ATM sends 
an electronic instruction to her bank for the desired cash "by 
punching the proper commands into the ATM."26 The electronic 
message is sent from the ATM to a central_ processing unit 
("CPU"), i.e., a computer that virtually simultaneously (1) sends 
the electronic message to the customer's bank, which withdraws 
the appropriate amount from the customer's account and notifies 
the CPU; (2) receives the notification from the customer's bank; 
and (3) sends confirmation to the ATM, instructing it to provide 
the required cash.27 For these services, a customer generally does 
not pay a fee if the customer's bank owns the ATM, although a 
charge is levied if the ATM owner is a different bank.28 
Importantly, credit card and debit card transactions share a 
common attribute -both are supported by "real" money; the debit 
card immediately when the amount is deducted from the 
cardholder's bank account, and the credit card when the charge is 
paid by the cardholder.29 Thus, both transactions travel through 
a financial institution and are accounted for by the actual 
movement of bank deposits, backed by reserves. Therefore, the 
Federal Reserve, as central banker, exercises control over both 
types of transactions. 
Recently, there has been significant growth in internet 
commerce and a great deal of increased interest in the use of 
electronic money ("e-money") in internet transactions.30 In 
contrast to credit or debit cards, true "e-money" can be created by 
a private entity, which can be used to purchase goods and services 
28 See id. at 55-57. 
.. See id. at 56. 
26 See id. at 57, 135. 
28 ld. at 135. 
21 See id. at 135-37. 
28 See id. at 137-38. 
28 See id. at 49. 
30 See id. at 64. 
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in a network established or controlled by that entity.31 In essence, 
"e-money" is a simple IOU that may not be backed by any 
reserves. 32 The "e-money" can function as a medium of exchange 
if it becomes generally accepted by people or companies that 
engage in commerce over the network. Even if"e-money" becomes 
accepted, it may never be reflected in any real money account at a 
financial institution and therefore, under current law, remains 
outside of the control of the Federal Reserve. 33 Even though both 
occur electronically, tracing "e-money" is problematic because it is 
more difficult than tracing official bank money.34 Nevertheless, 
as the Internet develops and expands and becomes an increasingly 
important avenue of commerce, "e-money" is likely to develop and 
expand as well. 
At the present time, the most common means of payment for 
consumer transactions remains the paper check,35 although this 
may be more a result of circumstance than studied preference. 
Moreover, often the payment of consumer credit card bills is 
accomplished using paper checks. Thus, the actual purchase · 
transaction is made by credit card and not by check. Although 
consumers can avoid using paper checks by banking electronically, 
banks often make paYm.ents to the recipient by paper check.36 
Currently, on-line bill presentment and payment is used only by 
a few major billers such as utilities, cable companies, and credit 
card companies.37 However, it is not difficult to foresee ordinary 
financial transactions by financial institutions and consumers 
conducted entirely by electronic means. 
Cash transactions are popular for small transactions and 
where privacy is desired. 38 To deal with the fact that credit card 
transaction costs are significant and uneconomic for small 
11 See id. at 65-66. 
12 See id. at 75-78. 
10 See id. at 66-68, 75-78. 
14 Id. 
.. See MULLER, supra note 6, at 408. 
'" Note, however, that the bank may also make the payment electronically, if provided 
with sufficient banking information about the recipient. See id. at 408-09. 
11 See id. at 410. 
18 See SWIRE, supra note 13, at 464 ("Nothing in the exchange of cash leaves any record 
linking the purchaser to the purchase"). 
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purchases,39 Stored Value Cards have been developed.4° Current 
"e-money" technology is capable of delivering products with 
varying degrees of privacy. For example, it is technologically 
possible to provide fully anonymous, cash-like systems, in which 
no personally identifiable transaction records are created. 41 On 
the other end of the spectrum, it is also technologically possible to 
provide fully auditable systems that can identify and store every 
transaction conducted by every consumer.42 Thus, the choice of 
which avenue to pursue or what mix to settle upon is less likely to 
be determined by the technological possibility of the choice than by 
consumers' desire for privacy in their electronic transactions. 
Technology makes it possible for the federal government 
taxing authorities to follow all commercial electronic transactions, 
if a fully auditable system were desired. A "blinding" technique, 
patented by encryption expert and mathematician Dr. David 
Chaum, can even preserve the anonymity of the user of a Stored 
Value Card.43 Under this technique, the bank is able to verify the 
electronic transfer without learning the identity of the payor. 44 
Likewise, the technique prevents the payee from learning the 
identity of the payer.45 Further, if the Stored Value Card contains 
any unused value, it can only be redeemed by transferring that 
value back to the account from which it originated.46 A fully 
.. See SOLOMON, supra note 5, at 411 . 
.., See id. at 68-71. 
41 See, e.g. SIFERS, supra note 9, at 724 ("Anonymity -the key feature of cash in the eyes 
of illicit transactors - can be preserved with smart cards, unlike other forms of verifmble 
electronic payment mechanisms such as debit cards and credit cards. For example, the use 
of an anonymous smart card is not identified at the point-of-sale when the card value is 
discharged. The recipient merely obtains value from the issuer which is eventually cleared 
through a clearing system, without the user being identified"). 
42 See id. at 723 ("Electronic payment systems are capable of establishing electronic audit 
trails with all of the features of non-electronic information"). 
.. See MULLER, supra note 6, at 432. See also SOLOMON, supra note 5, at 63 (detailing Dr. 
Chaum's other contributions to "e-money"). 
" See, e.g. supra note 41. 
.. See Muller, supra note 6, at 432. 
'" See, e.g. SIFERS, supra note 9, at 714 (noting that electronic money may be created with 
a feature which would require "links to the current owner" such that once a smart card is 
used to make a payment, any refund of that payment would necessarily go back to the 
original purchaser's card). 
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auditable system could eliminate the potential of an electronic 
black market. 47 
. Based on a study sanctioned in October 1996 by Chairman 
Alan Greenspan, 48 the Federal Reserve has noted that the new 
payment methods have failed to duplicate the convenience and the 
widespread acceptance of the current paper-based check system for 
most consumers and businesses' everyday transactions. The 
Federal Reserve, however, is seeking to encourage and facilitate 
new electronic retail payment methods. 49 
This section described how non-cash commerce takes place and 
highlighted some of the developments that have made electronic 
transfers more adaptable to consumer use. The review of these 
techniques and the literature written about them clearly indicates 
that electronic transfers are receiving much thought in both the 
private and government sectors. 50 With the current technological 
developments, a largely currency-free economy is likely to occur in 
the near future. The substitution of electronic transfers for 
currency is likely to accelerate as counterfeiting of paper currency 
becomes easier due to these same technological developments. 51 
Such acceleration would be consistent with the transformations 
that have taken place in the brokerage industry (computerized 
portfolio accounts ·have largely replaced share certificates), the 
mutual fund industry (all accounts are reflected in computerized 
statements updated to current net asset value virtually daily), and 
the airline industry (ticket-less travel), among others. Whether 
these changes are good or bad is immaterial to this paper. What 
is important is that the movement toward electronic transfers as 
the principal (and perhaps some day as the only) form of payment 
in commerce appears inevitable. 
41 See id. at 723 - 724(describing potentially improper uses of electronic money and how 
they may be prevented through tracing). 
.. See MULLER, supra note 6, at 430-31. 
.. Id. 
00 See generally SOLOMON, supra note 5 (discussing the various endeavors in electronic 
transfers). 
61 Other technological developments in the Internet will admittedly create security 
concerns regarding conducting transactions electronically. 
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III. ECONOMIC THEORY OF TAX INCIDENCE AND EFFICIENT 
TAXATION 
A Tax Incidence 
11 
Choosing a tax system is the art of burden sharing. While the 
choice of a burden-sharing system establishes the legal or 
statutory incidence of the tax, it does not determine who actually 
bears the economic burden or economic incidence of the tax. 52 
Deterrilining who bears the economic incidence requires 
substantially more analysis of the tax effect on the goods and labor 
markets. 53 
1. Economic Incidence of a· Tax, in General 
Determining the economic incidence of a tax is complicated, 
yet important because it is situated at the heart of the political 
debate of who should bear the burden of taxes and whether that 
burden is distributed fairly. If one were to conduct a survey, one 
would suspect that most taxpayers would say they bear a 
disproportionately large burden of the tax. However, even if the 
survey respondents were completely aware of the legal incidence 
of the tax, i.e., who bears the legal responsibility for and actually 
pays the tax, it is unlikely that they would know who bears the 
actual burden of the tax, i.e., the economic incidence of the tax. 
A simple example will illustrate this point. If the federal 
government were to decide to impose a $0.60 tax on a gallon of 
gasoline, it could do so in two ways.54 First, the federal 
government could impose that tax on the gasoline seller, so that for 
each gallon of gasoline sold the seller is liable for the $0.60 tax. 55 
One would conclude, at least upon casual observation, that the 
•• See generally HALR. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS (4th ed. 1996); ANDREW 
B. ABEL & BEN S. BERNANKE, MACROECONOMICS (3d ed. 1998); and HARVEY S. RoSEN, 
PuBLIC FINANCE (5th ed. 1999) . 
.. Id. 
.. See VARIAN, supra- note 52, at 289-91; RoSEN, supra note 52, at 260-63. 
.. See RoSEN, supra note 52, at 262 (illustration oflegal incidence of tax on seller). 
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seller bears the burden of that tax. 56 Alternatively, the federal 
government could impose the statutory burden of the tax on the 
gasoline buyer by requiring the buyer to pay an additional $0.60 
for each gallon of gasoline purchased.57 Under this scenario, a 
casual observer would conclude that the buyer bears the burden of 
tax. 58 In fact, both of these situations are economically 
equivalent, 59 and how the burden of the tax is shared between the 
buyer and the seller under either of these situations cannot be 
determined unless an analysis is done regarding the effect of the 
tax on the price of the gasoline. 
Assume the seller has the legal responsibility to pay the tax. 
If the price of gasoline increases by the same $0.60 for which the 
seller is legally liable upon the sale of a gallon of gasoline, one can 
conclude that the buyer bears the burden or economic incidence of 
the tax. 60 On the other hand, if the price to the buyer remains the 
same because the seller absorbs the entire tax without increasing 
the price, one can conclude that the economic incidence of the tax 
falls on the seller.61 Finally, the seller could pass only a portion of 
the tax to the buyer, in which case the economic incidence of the 
tax would be shared by the buyer and the seller, even though the 
legal incidence is imposed on the seller.62 
A similar analysis can be. used if the legal incidence of the tax 
is instead imposed upon the buyer.63 The results with regard to 
how the burden is shared between buyer and seller will be 
identical. 64 Because the legal incidence of a tax does not determine 
its economic incidence, a tax is more properly described as imposed 
upon transactions rather than either buyer or seller. 65 Thus, in 
analyzing the distributional effect of a tax, one must look past the 
.. ld. 
07 ld. at 260 (illustration oflegal incidence of tax on buyer). 
.. See VARIAN, supra note 52, at 290-91. 
.. See id. at 289-91 for a mathematical demonstration of this equivalence. See also 
RoSEN, supra note 52, at 260-63. 
.. See VARIAN, supra note 52, at 290 . 
•• ld. 
62 See id. at 298-95. 
.. See id. at 290 . 
.. ld. 
.. See generally supra note 59. 
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legal incidence of the tax to the economic incidence. 66 One can not 
determine the amount of "tax shifting" that will occur a priori.61 
Conclusions drawn from the foregoing examples can be 
extended to other taxes. For example, consider an income tax 
where tax rates are equal for all concerned. Inclusion of an 
amount in the recipient's income should be the economic 
equivalent of denying a deduction for that amount to the payor. 
Accordingly, excluding interest payments from a recipient's income 
and disallowing a deduction for the interest to the payor would be 
equivalent to allowing a deduction to the payor but including the 
interest as income to the recipient. In reality, the former method 
is likely to have a greater impact on redistribution of wealth 
because tax rates vary among taxpayers and, in particular, many 
lenders are tax-free entities such as pension funds. 
While the legal incidence of the corporate tax is borne by the 
corporation, a faceless entity, people must bear the economic 
incidence. These people may include the stockholders of the 
corporation, the owners of land or equipment leased to the 
corporation, lenders to the corporation, employees of the 
corporation, and consumers who purchase the corporation's 
products. The portion of the tax attributable to the production 
process will be borne by the factors of production, including both 
the suppliers of capital (i.e., the stockholders, lenders of money, 
and lessors of land and equipment) and the laborers (i.e., 
employees). To the extent that the tax is reflected in the price of 
the corporation's products, the tax will be borne by consumers. 
Complicating the analysis, there are substantial cross-overs in 
these roles. For example, laborers may also be consumers. 
Likewise, both laborers and consumers may also be stockholders 
of the corporation or of another corporation that bears the legal 
incidence of the corporate income tax. 
The economic incidence of tax affects the distribution of tax 
burdens among income classes. Assume the government imposes 
a $0.60 per gallon gasoline tax on sellers. Suppose all gasoline 
sellers tend to be rich and buyers·tend to be poor. It is unclear 
that the poor buyers do not bear a disproportionate share of the 
60 See VARIAN, supra note 52, at 293-95. 
"' See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 263-65. 
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tax. 68 Furthermore, the economic incidence of the tax depends 
upon how the tax revenues ~e used.69 For example, if the 
proceeds of the gasoline tax imposed upon the seller of gasoline are 
used to feed the homeless, the tax and its disposition will have a 
redistributive effect from the wealthier to the poorer. 
2. Determining the Economic Incidence of a Tax 
The incidence of a tax imposed per unit of product or as a 
proportion of the price of a product depends on the elasticities of 
supply and demand for that product. 70 The more elastic the 
demand curve for the product, 71 the smaller the effect of a per unit 
tax on the price of the commodity and therefore, the smaller the 
burden of that tax which will be borne by the consumer.72 
Similarly, the more elastic the supply curve for the product,73 the 
smaller the portion of the tax that will be borne by producers74• 
For example, if the demand curve is inelastic because consumers 
cannot readily turn to other products as substitutes for the product 
to be taxed, a change in price will have very little effect on the 
amount demanded and the consumers will bear the greatest 
portion of the economic incidence of the tax.75 Similarly, when 
supplyis inelastic,76 the tax will be borne by the supplier.77 Ifthe 
68 This is an example of a regressive tax. Poor buyers may bear a disproportionate share 
of the tax in relation to their income. They will pay a higher percentage of their income on 
gasoline, compared to rich buyer8, who have more money to spend. See, e.g. RoSEN, supra 
note 52, at 258 (a tax is regressive where the average rate of tax increases as income 
decreases). 
.. See, e.g. VARIAN, supra note 52, at 256-57. 
70 See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 263-65. 
71 That is, the greater the percentage change in demand that occurs as a result of a one 
percent change in price, and therefore, the more responsive the quantity demanded is to a 
price change (the flatter the demand curve). See VARIAN, supra note 52, at 265-68. 
72 See RoSEN, supra note 52, at 264 . 
.,. That is, the greater the percentage change in the supply of a product that will be 
forthcoming as a result of a one percent change in its price, and therefore, the more 
responsive the quantity supplied is to a price change. See VARIAN, supra note 52, at 294. 
•• See RoSEN, supra note 52, at 264. 
•• The supply and demand functions will be influenced by the degree of competitiveness 
in the relevant industry being studied. See VARIAN, supra note 52, at 283-84. 
'" Inelastic supply is essentially fixed and is depicted by a vertical or near vertical supply 
curve. See id. at 285. 
77 See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 264. 
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supply is perfectly inelastic, i.e., the supply curve is perfectly 
vertical because supply is fixed in amount, the producer will bear 
the entire burden of the tax because the equilibrium price after 
imposition of the tax will remain at the original price, thereby 
relieving consumers of the burden of that tax entirely.78 
This analysis applies both to per unit and ad valorem taxes. 79 
Ad valorem taxes are taxes imposed as a percentage of the price.80 
For example, the District of Columbia imposes an ad valorem tax 
on most goods at the rate of six percent. State and local sales 
taxes on food and clothing and the European style of VATs are 
examples of ad valorem taxes. 81 The economic analysis involving 
shifting curves is somewhat different from that involving a per 
unit tax in that the ad valorem tax shifts curves proportionately, 
in contrast to a per unit tax, which shifts curves uniformly at each 
place along the curve.82 However, the analysis of economic 
incidence of the tax is essentially the same. 83 The incidence of the 
tax is determined by the elasticities of supply and demand for the 
product.84 . 
As illustrated above, a tax imposed on any product will be 
shared by producers and consumers, depending upon the nature of 
the supply and demand for the end product.85 Similarly, a tax 
imposed upon a factor of production will be shared between the 
supplier of that factor and the business firm that uses the factor 
to make the final product. 86 The burden sharing will also be 
determined in accordance with the supply and demand functions 
for that factor of production. 87 For example, consider the economic 
incidence of the payroll taxes used to finance social security. 
These taxes are imposed on the worker at the rate of 7.65% of a 
78 See VARIAN, supra note 52, at 293-94; see also RoSEN, supra note 52, at 263-65, (for 
graphical analyses of these special cases). 
'" See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 265. 
80 Id. 
•• See id. at 265,447. 
82 See id. at 265. 
83 See id. at 265-66 (for a graphical analysis of these taxes). 
"' See id. at 266. 
.. See supra notes 52 - 84, and accompanying text. 
88 See id. at 266-68 (for examples of tax on factors of production). 
87 Id. 
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worker's earnings, and on the employer, also at the rate of7.65% 
of the worker's earnings.88 The economic incidence of the total tax 
of 15.3% is dependent upon the supply and demand for labor faced 
by the particular firm and not simply upon the legal incidence of 
the tax.89 Moreover, different industries face different supply and 
demand curves for labor, making a general conclusion about the 
economic incidence of payroll taxes impossible to reach without 
substantial information on the relevant elasticities of the supply 
and demand functions for labor in the industry. 90 
The analysis becomes substantially more complicated when it 
is extended to an analysis of general equilibrium. General 
equilibrium analysis involves looking at the secondary and tertiary 
effects of changes to the supply and demand curves of an industry 
or factor. 91 For example, suppose a tax is imposed on gasoline as 
in the illustration above. A partial equilibrium analysis involves 
the determination of the sharing of that tax between buyers and 
sellers of gasoline. A general equilibrium analysis involves the 
effects on other markets of that portion ofthe,tax borne by buyers 
or sellers. If buyers of gasoline are farmers, for instance, and they 
bear a portion of the economic incidence of the tax, they may 
reduce the use of gasoline and, in turn, reduce production of 
agricultural prodU:cts or substitute labor for mechanization, or 
both, thereby altering their supply functions. This may reduce the 
marginal product oflabor and thereby the equilibrium wage rates 
in that industry. In that way, the tax on gasoline may be borne, in 
part by farm laborers or, more graphically, perhaps migrant farm 
workers who do not even drive or buy gasoline directly. Moreover, 
producers of complementary goods and owners of their factors of 
production will also be adversely affected. Thus, if the tax is 
imposed on an item that has a substantial effect on other markets, 
general equilibrium analysis, which takes into account the ways in 
which various markets are interrelated, would be necessary in 
order to truly understand the economic incidence of the tax. 
88 See, e.g. I.R.C. § 3101 (payroll tax on employees) and§ 3111 (payroll tax on employers). 
89 See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 274-75. 
00 See id. at 267. 
91 See id. at 27 4. 
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Thus, in order to determine who bears the burden of a tax, the 
complicated partial and general equilibrium analyses must be 
pl,lrsued. The determination involves analysis of market structure, 
supply and demand elasticities, mobility of factors of production, 
and perhaps many other issues. Many taxes, such as the corporate 
income tax, have an uncertain incidence. One can conclude that 
a tax imposed on the income of a corporation almost certainly is 
not borne entirely by the shareholders of the corporation. 92 Beyond 
that, it is very difficult to determine how that tax is shared. 
Simple statements about the incidence of a tax tend to be wrong 
because of the multiple effects on market equilibrium. 
B. Taxation And Efficiency 
Because taxes are a means of raising revenue, the minimum 
requirement of an efficient tax is that it costs consumers no more 
than the taxes collected. On first observation, it would appear that 
most taxes achieve that goal, without taking into account the 
direct and indirect costs of computing and collecting the tax.93 
However, the potential inefficiency of taxes is much greater than 
at first appears. Some taxes distort economic decisions and 
arguably result in a loss of general welfare. To the extent that a 
tax distorts economic decisions and results in a loss of welfare in 
excess of the tax revenues collected, the taxes are said to involve 
an "excess burden. ,g4 This "excess burden" is sometimes referred 
to as a "welfare cost" or "deadweight loss."95 
Excess burden occurs because a tax generally forces consumers 
to accept lower amounts of utility than they had previously enjoyed 
by choosing a different mix of products, represented by a move to 
lower indifference curves. 96 Consumers choose a different mix of 
goods in part because the tax reduces the total amount of goods 
they can purchase (the wealth effect) and in part because the 
consumers substitute other goods for those that are taxed (the 
02 See id. at 282. 
.. See, e.g. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at132-33 (discussing generally the costs of 
compliance with the tax laws). 
"' See VARIAN, supra note 52, at 297; RoSEN, supra note 52, at 284. 
"" See VARIAN, supra note 52, at 295-97. 
98 See RoSEN, supra note 52, at 285-88 for a graphical representation of this phenomenon. 
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substitution effect).97 The reduction in utility is measured by the 
amount of reduced income the consumer necessarily would have 
suffered in order to place her at her post-tax level of utility.98 
Thus, the true loss inflicted on the consumer is not the tax paid, 
but rather the amount of reduced income that would have caused 
the same decrease in utility.99 
In contrast to unit and ad valorem taxes on commodities, an 
income tax, which merely reduces the consumer's budget 
constraint to a lower level, appears less distortive than a tax on 
commodities; however, an income tax distorts the consumer's 
choice between leisure and work, and, therefore, between leisure 
and all other goods. 100 As such, it too has a distortive effect and 
entails an excess burden. 101 
The nature and extent of the distortive effect of the income tax 
depends upon the following two effects that must be analyzed 
independently: (1) the income effect, which is due solely to the loss 
of income because relative prices of leisure and other goods are 
unaffected; and (2) the substitution effect, which occurs because 
the income tax causes leisure to become relatively less expensive 
than other commodities, which can only be purchased with income 
subject to tax. 102 These effects may be additive or they may be 
offsetting. As a matter of pure theory, it is unclear which effect 
predominates and, therefore, whether the income tax depresses 
the supply oflabor because the substitution effect causes people to 
substitute untaxed leisure for taxed work, or whether the income 
effect increases the supply of labor because it reduces workers' 
wealth and causes them to work more hours in order to sustain 
their current standard of living. 103 
It should be noted that although most taxes create some 
distortion and generate excess burdens, such a burden does not 
necessarily mean that the tax is bad. If the government requires 
revenue raised through taxes, excess burdens are unavoidable. 
"' See id. at 292; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 104. 
08 See RoSEN, supra note 52, at 285-86. 
80 See id. at 286-87. 
100 See SLEMROD & BAKJJA, supra note 4, at 105-06. 
101 See RoSEN, supra note 52, at 297-99. 
"" See id. at 525. 
103 See id. at 376-79 (for a graphical analysis of the effects of an income tax). 
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Indeed, even if we could determine the excess burden, society may 
be satisfied with a trade-off involving some amount of excess 
burden in order to achieve greater faimess, however that may be 
defined. Nonetheless, before the trade-off can be evaluated, the 
excess burden of a particular tax must be known, and that is a 
complicated task. 
Moreover, where multiple taxes are used, such as an income 
tax in addition to a tax on commodities, it is unclear whether any 
one tax increases or decreases distortions. This means that a 
single tax cannot be studied in isolation but rather must be studied 
in conjunction with all other taxes and perhaps even all other 
distorting factors in the economy. 
Finally, one can conclude, at least in theory, that the most 
efficient tax is the one that minimizes excess burdens. 104 The 
overall excess burden will be minimized when the marginal excess 
bilrden of the last dollar of revenue raised from each commodity is 
the same.105 To the extent that these marginal excess burdens are 
not equal, the overall excess burden can be lowered by raising the 
tax rate on the commodity with the smaller marginal excess 
burden or by lowering the tax on the commodity with the larger 
marginal excess burden. 106 This rule, however, does not translate 
into equal tax rates on all commodities. 107 Because elasticities of 
demand for commodities differ, the marginal excess burdens may 
be equalized with different tax rates applied to various 
commodities.108 This analysis is complicated even further when 
one includes income taxation because of the income and 
substitution effects with regard to leisure, also a commodity.109 
Moreover, even a tax that minimizes excess burden may not be 
acceptable unless society is satisfied that it is "fair." What seems 
clear, however, is that simple statements about inefficiencies of 
taxes, due to incentive and disincentive effects, are likely to be 
misleading oversimplifications. 
1
.. See id. at 284. 
108 See id. at 310-13. 
108 ld. 
107 Id. 
108 ld. at 310-13. 
100 See id. at 313. 
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N. PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 
Both the incidence and the efficiency of a tax system depend 
upon how taxes affect behavior.110 An income tax system, even one 
that does not contain tax incentive subsidies, influences labor 
supply, saving, consumption, and portfolio decisions.m The 
current income tax system influences, and is indeed intended to 
influence, other behavior, including housing choices, 112 business 
equipment purchases, 113 research and experimental 
expenditures, 114 expenditures on low income housing, 115 loans to 
state and local governments evidenced by state or local bonds, 116 
and a myriad of other decisions. 
A. Effect on Labor Supply 
Perhaps the most important behavioral incentive involves the 
effect of the taxation of income itself on the labor supply.117 As 
explained above, an income tax exempts leisure from taxation and, 
therefore, causes a substitution ofleisure for other commodities. 118 
On the other hand, an income tax also reduces the wealth of the 
taxpayer, and therefore, may cause the taxpayer to work more 
hours to compensate for the reduced wealth.119 Accordingly, theory 
alone can not predict whether the income tax depresses or 
increases the supply oflabor.120 
no For a general discussion, see id. at 376-85. 
111 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 102 et seq (illustrating the various influences 
of tax on individual behaviors, and how some may work in opposite directions). 
112 See, e.g. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3Xdeduction for home mortgage interest). 
,,. See, e.g. I.R.C. § 168 (accelerated cost recovery systems for tangible depreciable 
property). 
n• See I.R.C. § 174 (deduction for research and experimental expenditures) and§ 41 
(credit for increasing research activities). 
''" See I.R.C. § 42 (credit for building low income housing). 
"" See I.R.C. § 103 (interest on state and local bonds excluded from gross income). 
117 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 103. 
ua See supra notes 102-03, and accompanying text. 
llD Id. 
120 See RoSEN, supra note 52, at 376-79. See also Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, 
Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: ANew Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 
1905, 1920 (1987) (discussing the substitution and income effects on taxation); Martin J. 
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The simple analysis above can be most easily understood if the 
income tax is assumed to be imposed at a uniform or flat rate. But 
even with such a tax, the net impact of the substitution and the 
income effects yields uncertainty and, in addition, may yield a 
different result for different taxpayers, depending upon their 
wealth, level of income, desire for leisure, need for savings, and 
non-pecuniary rewards from work. 121 
When one complicates the analysis by assuming a progressive 
tax in which different levels of income are taxed at different rates, 
the analysis can proceed along the same theoretical lines, except 
that the after-tax demand curve for leisure is no longer linear, as 
it would be with a proportional tax, but becomes convex.122 The 
convexity of the curve demonstrates a greater distortion and 
incentive toward leisure at the high end of the income spectrum. 
To the extent that there is variation among individuals in the 
choice of work or leisure with the imposition of a flat tax, an even 
greater variation with the imposition of a graduated tax rate is 
likely. 123 
One can only determine the effect of the tax on the 
work/leisure trade-off empirically, 124 and even then, one is unlikely 
to be able to conclude much about its effect on labor without 
specifying the type of labor, level of compensation for that labor, 
and the supplier of that labor (e.g., male or female, old or young, 
McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive 
Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 58-59 (1998) (exploring the economic theory underlying the 
effect oftax rates on the labor supply and its manifestation in the income and substitution 
effects); Lawrence Zelenak, The Reification of Metaphor: Income Taxes, Consumption Taxes 
and Human Capital, 51 TAXL. REV. 1, 12 n. 50 (1995) (offering an example of the operation 
of the substitution and income effect on consumption). 
121 See BANKMAN & GRIFFITH, supra note 120 , at 58-59 (arguing the difficulty that 
economic theory has with predicting whether the income or substitution effect will 
predominate); Lawrence Zelenak & Kemper Morelan, Can the Graduated Income Tax 
Survive Optimal Tax Analysis?, 53 TAX L. REV. 51 n.5 (1999) (discussing the income and 
substitution effects). 
122 See ROSEN, supra note 31, at 378-79 (for a graphical analysis of this phenomenon). 
123 See Lawrence Zelenak, The Selling of the Flat Tax: The Dubious Link Between Rate 
and Base, 2 CHAP. L.REV. 197, n. 110 (1999) (arguing that a graduated cash flow tax "may 
cause substantial deadweight loss even if the net result of the income and substitution 
effects is no change in observed behavior"). 
124 See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 379-80 (summarizing some empirical fmdings). See also 
Robert Triest, Fundamental Tax Reform and Labor Supply, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF 
FuNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 247,256 (HenryJ. Aaron & William G. Gale eds., 1996). 
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married or single).125 Indeed, for higher income taxpayers, it is 
entirely possible that an increase in the marginal tax rate will 
reduce the amount of labor supplied sufficiently to reduce the 
overall tax collection from that taxpayer. 126 This is an example of 
the "Laffer" curve, which depicts a hypothesis in which a tax rate 
exceeding a certain level causes revenue to fall rather than rise. 127 
While the Laffer curve relationship has been largely discredited for 
taxpayers in general, 128 it has continuing vitality for high marginal 
rate taxpayers because it seems clear that the revenue-maximizing 
tax rate is not the same for all income groups or for all types of 
income. 129 In addition, if tax revenues are used to provide public 
goods, there may be a further disincentive towards work and 
therefore, an incentive towards leisure.13° Further, under the 
current income tax system, the degree of progressivity is likely to 
affect the compensation package oflaborers. High marginal rates 
generate non-taxable fringe benefits as a substitute for cash 
compensation and stock options as a substitute for cash bonuses. 
B. Effect on Saving 
Of even greater current interest in the tax policy debate than 
the effect of tax rates on the supply of labor, is the effect of tax 
rates on saving. 131 The importance of the income tax and high tax 
rates on savings is the effect on investment and capital. The 
availability of capital to finance investment is dependent upon 
savings, and to the extent savings are adversely affected by income 
120 See RoSEN, supra note 52, at 380-82. 
128 See id. at 383-85 
121 For a detailed description of the Laffer Curve, see ALFRED L. MAI.ABRE, JR., LoST 
PROPHETS 181-82 {1994); see also Joel B. Slemrod, On the High-Income Laffer Curve, in TAX 
PROGRESSMTY AND INCOME INEQUALITY 177, 203 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 1994). 
128 See, e.g. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 124-125 (noting that all but the "most 
ardent supply-siders" believe that labor supply responds significantly to tax cuts); see also 
ROSEN, supra note 52, at 384-85. 
1211 See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 382-85. 
130 See id. at 164-96 (discussion of the influence of welfare as a disincentive to work). 
... For a general discussion, see id. at 385-94. 
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taxes, there will be a shortfall in capital and theoretically a decline 
in future productivity.132 
Consumption tax proponents argue that income taxation 
depresses savings because it alters a taxpayer's choice between 
present and future consumption, creating a bias towards present 
consumption. 133 This bias occurs because the tax imposed on the 
earnings of savings reduces those future earnings.134 Consumption 
tax proponents argue that savings are taxed twice under an income 
tax. 135 Because of this double tax, they conclude that the income 
tax results in less savings and more present consumption than 
would occur in the absence of an income tax. 136 
In fact, an economic analysis of the taxation of income, 
including earnings on savings, shows a combination of effects, the 
net result of which is uncertain.137 The taxation of interest income, 
taken alone, should cause a substitution of current consumption 
for future consumption and therefore, a reduction in savings.138 
This is an example of the substitution effect.139 However, the 
taxation of interest income reduces a taxpayers' future wealth and 
may cause the taxpayer to save more in order to offset that 
reduction in future wealth. 140 This is an example of the income 
effect.141 The substitution effect and the income effect may work 
in the same direction, thereby reducing savings, or they may work 
132 See ABEL & BERNANKE, supra note 52, at 119. See also Thomas Michael Federico, 
Recent Congresswnal Consumptwn Tax Proposals: A Theoretical Inquiry into their Effects 
on the Declining U.S. Saving Rate, 7 U. FLA. J. L. & PuB. POL 'y 337, 357 (1996) (savings are 
adversely affected under the income tax because they are taxed twice); M. Scotland Morris, 
Reframing the Flat Tax Debate: Three Not-So-Easy Steps for Evaluating Radical Tax 
Reform Proposals, 48 FLA. L. REv. 159, 172 (1996) (noting that an income tax taxes both 
consumption and savings, while a consumption tax does not tax savings). 
w See id. See also SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 168-70. 
1M See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 109. 
m See FEDERICO, supra note 132, at 357. 
"" See, e.g. ARCHER, supra note 3, at 3-4. 
117 See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 385-94. 
118 See id. at 389 (where tax reduces the rate of interest received, the opportunity cost for 
consuming a dollar in the present becomes more appealing than consuming that same 
dollar, plus the reduced interest, in the future). 
111 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 104. 
140 See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 390. 
1•1 Id. 
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in opposite directions, creating offsetting effects with an uncertain 
net result. 142 
. To complicate matters further, some returns on savings, such 
as capital gains, are not taxed until realized and even then are 
taxed at preferential rates, 143 so the current form of the income tax 
may involve different substitution and income effects than the 
simpler model in which all earnings are taxed at a uniform rate. 144 
In addition, with the varying tax rates of a progressive tax system 
and varying tradeoffs regarding present and future consumption, 
generalizations about the effect of the income tax on savings 
become even more suspect.145 These complications lead one to 
conclude that the effect of taxation on savings cannot be predicted 
without empirical work. Moreover, since the effect of interest rates 
on the magnitude of savings is a subject of controversy, 146 the effect 
of taxation on that interest income cannot be determined with 
certainty. 
Even if high rates of income tax could be shown to depress 
desired savings and capital formation, a conclusion about the 
advisability of adopting or retaining an income tax would still 
require more analysis. The question is not simply whether income 
taxation affects capital formation, but rather whether it affects 
capital formation more than other alternative methods of taxation. 
An answer to this question depends in large part on a 
problematical analysis of the incidence of alternative forms of 
taxation. 147 
Finally, even if the income tax does adversely affect savings or, 
conversely, if incentives could be built into the income tax to 
encourage savings, the savings would only positively affect 
productivity in the economy to the extent they remained available 
,., Id. 
''" I.R.C. § 1 (h) (maximum capital gain rate). See I.R.C. § 1222 (9) (capital gain net 
income defmed). 
'" See ANDREWS, supra note 2, at 1115. 
146 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 110. 
,.. See Eric M. Engen & William G. Gale, The Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform on 
Saving, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 83, 96 (Henry J. Aaron & 
William G. Gale eds. 1996). 
147 See Engen & Gale, supra note 146, at 83-84. 
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for domestic uses. To the extent that savings financed 
international investment, the effect on productivity woul~ be nil. 
V. DEADWEIGHT LOSS: COST OF ADMINISTERING THE 
PERSONAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM 
A Direct Costs of the Personal Income Tax System 
For simplicity, theoretical analyses of alternative tax systems 
in terms of efficiency and equity often assume that tax collection 
. involves no direct administrative costs. 148 If one departs from this 
unrealistic assumption, one must then evaluate a tax system by 
taking into account the costs of running the tax system, which 
include the costs of collecting the taxes and the costs incurred by 
taxpayers both in complying with the tax system and in planning 
within the tax system. Compliance and planning costs include the 
professional services of accountants and tax lawyers as well as the 
taxpayer's own time and efforts. 
Joel Slemrod estimated that the direct cost of running the 
Federal income tax system was around $75 billion.149 This figure 
consists of the total compliance cost of the individual income tax 
($50 billion), the total compliance cost of the income tax imposed 
on businesses other than self-employed individuals ($20 billion), 
and the Service budget devoted to income tax ($5 billion). 150 
Seventy-five billion total equals about 10% of the revenue collected 
from the income tax.151 This estimate was based on surveys of 
2,000 Minnesota taxpayers for studies published by Slemrod and 
Sorum and by Slemrod and Blumenthal, in 1982 and 1989, 
148 See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 376- 94 (looking at effect of tax rate and labor supply on 
savings at labor supply). Costs of compliance tend to be treated as a separate category of 
analysis. See, e.g. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 131-33; see generally FRONTIERS OF 
TAX REFORM, supra note 4 (which sets forth various tax reform proposals, none of which 
deal with any specificity with the expected costs of compliance). 
"" Joel Slemrod, Which is the Simplest Tax System of Them All? in ECONOMIC EFFECTS 
OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 355, 368 (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale eds. 1996). 
100 ld. at 357-58. 
••• I d. at 358. 
HeinOnline -- 20 Va. Tax Rev. 26 2000-2001
26 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 20:1 
respectively.152 The results were then extrapolated to the entire 
Uniteq States. 153 
Other studies on taxpayer compliance costs have also been 
conducted. The consulting firm of Arthur D. Little (ADL), for 
example, in a survey commissioned by the Service to estimate the 
paperwork burden of the federal income tax reporting system 
estimated that individuals spent approximately 1.6 billion hours 
and businesses approximately 2. 7 billion hours on tax compliance 
in 1983.154 James L. Payne translated these time expenditures into 
dollar values by multiplying the hours by an appropriate average 
hourly value of time adjusted to 1985.155 This method of analysi~ 
generated an estimated taxpayer compliance cost for 1985 of 
$153.6 billion.156 If one also included in the computation the cost 
of hiring professional assistance, the total cost of taxpayer 
compliance would be approximately $159.4 billion for 1985 and 
$225.8 billion after adjusting to 1995 dollars. 157 Arthur Hall, using 
similar methods, reached a 1995 estimate of taxpayer compliance 
cost of $141.4 billion.158 The principal difference between the 
estimates of Payne and Hall, which Slemrod views as too high, 159 
and Slemrod's own estimates involves the much higher average 
value on time spent on tax compliance used by Payne and Hall 
than by Slemrod.160 
Based upon a study commissioned by the Service, Robert Hall 
and Alvin Rabushka indicate that the direct costs of running the 
federal income tax system would be $159 billion per year in 
162 See ld. at 361, ·n.9. 
,.. See id. at 363. 
,.. See I d. at 364-65; but see SLEMROD & BAIOJA. supra note 4, at 132-33 (arguing that the 
studies on the costs of compliance conducted by Arthur D. Little, and relied upon by the 
Service, were flawed and thus make any estimates based upon them unreliable). 
160 See SLEMROD, supra note 149, at 365. See generally JAMES PAYNE, COSTLY RETURNS: 
THE BURDEN OF THE U.S. TAX SYsTEM (1993). 
108 SLEMROD, supra note 149, at 365. See also ARTHUR D. LITI'LE, DEVELOPMENT IN 
METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING THE TAXPAYER PAPERWORK BURDEN, 1-7 (1988). 
167 /d. at 369. 
,.. Id. at 366. See also Arthur P. Hall, Compliance Costs of Alternative Tax Systems, 
Ways and Means Testimony, Tax Foundation, Special Brief(June); see also Replacing the 
·Federal Income Tax: Hearings Before the House comm. On Ways and Means, 1041h Cong. 
164 (1995) (Arthur P. Hall testifying). 
169 See id. 
'
80 Id. 
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1985.161 In their own estimate of direct costs, Hall and Rabushka 
include a minimum of $100 billion in taxpayer compliance costs, 
including costs of filing and buying expert advice.162 They estimate 
the costs of planning, such as consulting with lawyers and other 
tax planners, to be at least another $35 billion.163 Lobbyists add 
another $50 billion, 164 for a total of at least $185 billion per year in 
direct costs. These estimates do not attempt to account for 
·imperfections of the system, which, for example, Hall and 
Rabushka estimate allow $100 billion to escape taxation through 
tax evasion.165 · Nor do they deal with the indirect costs of the 
present system, including disincentive effects that reduce output 
and cause a misallocation of resources, which Payne estimates to 
approach $200 billion. 166 Hall and Rabushka's estimates also do 
not account for the cost to the Service of administering the tax 
laws, estimated by Slemrod at approximately $5 billion. 167 
Thus, in contrast to the theorizing done to estimate and 
evaluate the excess burdens resulting from the taxes themselves, 
the administrative costs of running the current system are much 
clearer and impose a significant deadweight loss on the economy. 
Moreover, there is no question regarding offsetting effects that 
may be involved. Administrative costs, including both those 
incurred by the government tax collectors and the taxpayers 
subjected to the tax, reduce social welfare. Whether those 
administrative costs amount to $75 billion, $159 billion, or even 
$275 billion, they are nevertheless very large. Further changes 
brought about by the tax legislation of 1993 and 1997/68 which 
161 HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 7; but see SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 
132-33 (arguing that the studies on the costs of compliance conducted by Arthur D. Little, 
and relied upon by the Service were flawed and thus make any estimates based upon them 
unreliable). 
182 HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 11-12 (noting that the advent of computer tax 
software may help to reduce the costs of compliance). 
163 Id. at 19. 
164 Id. 
166 Id. at 15. 
166 SLEMROD, supra note 149, at 365, n.18; see also PAYNE, supra note 155. 
167 Id. at 368. 
166 See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788; Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312. 
HeinOnline -- 20 Va. Tax Rev. 28 2000-2001
28 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 20:1 
have arguably added additional complexity to the system, 169 may 
have increased these costs. 
In addition, tax evasion involves societal costs in addition to 
the lost revenue, estimated by Hall and Rabashka at $100 
billion.170 A tax system that is prone to tax evasion is one that will 
involve ·even greater administrative costs since the revenue 
collectors expend a portion of their budget to stop the evasion. 17~ 
A tax system that can be avoided is likely to generate an 
underground economy in which incentives and prices differ from 
the legal economy, likely adding to inefficiencies in the economy.172 
Administrative and compliance costs can substantially affect 
the excess burdens resulting from a tax system and, therefore, its 
desirability. A tax system that minimizes administrative and 
compliance costs is a system that should enjoy a presumption of 
greater ·efficiency than a tax system which involves substantial 
administrative and compliance costs. While minimizing these 
costs should not be the only objective of tax reform or the sole 
determinant for the selection of a tax system, it is surely an 
important factor that must be carefully considered in evaluating 
competing systems. 
Whatever the merits of the arguments regarding the incidence 
of the income tax and the direction and seriousness of the 
disincentives towards work and savings, it cannot be 
overemphasized that the current income tax system is very 
expensive to administer, both to the government and to the 
taxpayers who are subjected to it.173 Further, the system fails to 
take advantage of technological capabilities regarding electronic 
money transfers that have been developed during the last few 
years. 174 Instead, the income tax system is based upon a method 
169 Additional changes in the tax law tend to add to complexity. See, e.g. SLEMROD & 
BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 141 (noting that the tax code becomes more complex as each lobby 
group gets input). · 
170 HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 15. 
111 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 149. 
112 See id. at 151-52. 
113 See supra notes 149-72 and accompanying text. 
114 Computer technology, however, has, to be sure, assisted in compliance. But, computer 
assistance in compliance may have fostered additional computational complexity. See, e.g. 
George Guttman, Microsoft Launches Tax Software Product, 85 TAX NOTES 1628 (1999). 
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of collection and record keeping that was acceptable in the early 
part of the Twentieth Century.175 It relies upon an annual self-
assessment by the taxpayer whereby each taxpayer must 
separately compile the relevant information and compute the 
income tax. Thus far, even attempts to move the system into a 
paperless tax return system, thereby making use of computer 
technology, have been unsuccessful. 176 
The direct costs of running an income tax system create a 
substantial burden to the economy.177 The income tax is often 
defended, however, as a means of attaining fairness in burden 
sharing.178 Nevertheless, if revenue could be collected in a 
substantially more efficient way, the economy would benefit. 
B. An Explanation of Why the Personal Income 
Tax System is Costly 
The. reasons for the high direct cost of the current income tax 
system include the following: (1) the antiquated method of 
computing and reporting annual income/79 (2) the excessive 
personalizing-of the income tax in order to achieve a perceived 
Furthermore, although President Clinton has proposed an electronic filing credit, where 
taxpayers get an additional $10 credit for filing electronically, tax analysts are skeptical as 
to whether it would significantly increase electronic filings, as well as concern that it add 
to an already profligate system of tax credits. See George Guttman, News Analysis: Clinton 
Administration Wants Electronic filing Credit, 86 TAX NOTES 451, 451-454 (2000). 
115 See FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 1, at 4 (noting that the "structural and 
policy conflicts have changed little over time" in the tax provisions). See for example George 
Guttman, Electronic Tax Administration: Still a Long Way To Go, 81 TAX NOTES 811, 815-
17 (1998) (one barrier to the implementation of a new electronic filing system includes the 
continued requirement for actual signatures). 
118 Despite publicity, the IRS does not get many electronic returns. Many people still flle 
paper returns. See, e.g. George Guttman, News Analysis- Deja Vu -IRS Unlikely to Hit 
Electronic Filing Goals, 84 STATE TAX NOTES 200, 200 (1999) (a target rate of80% eJectronic 
filings was set to be achieved by 2007; currently, only 8% of filings are undertaken 
electronically). See also generally supra notes 174-75. 
m See, e.g. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 128. 
118 See id. at 49, 135. See also GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX, 
supra note 4, at 222 ("More than eighty years ago when this nation adopted the Sixteenth 
Amendment, achieving fairness in the distribution of the tax burden was the essential 
reason for taxing income and for taxing it at progressive rates."); see generally Erik M. 
Jensen, Unapportioned Direct-Consumption Taxes and The Sixteenth Amendment, 84 Tax 
NOTES 1089 (1999). 
119 See generally FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 1, at 4. 
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fairness or to reward or provide incentives for particular behavior; 
(3) the lines that must be drawn to measure accurately a 
taxpayer's personal income;180 and (4) the imposition of tax on 
complex financial transactions (e.g., sales of stock and corporate-
shareholder transactions.) 
The first of these elements, the taxpayer's annual self-
assessment of tax based upon annual reporting of income and 
deductions, results from a system that was designed in 1913. 
Based on that model, the income tax has become substantially 
more complicated. The current system is encumbered with 
multiple phase-outs for such items as personal exemptions, 
itemized deductions, and various educational tax credits.181 It also 
contains complicating features in the computation of taxable 
income, such as the passive activity loss rules, 182 at-risk rules, 183 
and net operating loss carryovers.184 To the extent record keeping 
and the interrelationship of years becomes more difficult, audits 
become more difficult and collection of tax rightfully owing 
becomes more problematic. 
The second element contributing to the inadequacy of the 
present income tax system is the virtually unending desire to 
personalize the tax so as to achieve fairness. 185 This desire has 
resulted in progressive rates, 186 rates depending upon marital 
status, 187 exemptions for children and other dependents, 188 phase-
outs of various deductions, 189 and other benefits as the level of a 
taxpayer's income increases. Further, the desire to reward or 
provide incentives for certain behavior by reducing a taxpayer's 
180 Measurement could involve determining whether an item of receipt constitutes income 
and whether an expenditure is a nondeductible personal expense or a deductible business 
expense incurred to earn income. 
181 See, e.g. I.R.C. § 63(d) (itemized deductions); § § 151-53 (personal exemptions); §25A 
(educational tax credits). 
182 See I.R.C. § 469. 
183 See I.R.C. § 465 . 
... See I.R.C. § 172(b) 
... See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 135 . 
... See I.R.C. §§ 1, 11. 
187 See I.R.C. § 1. 
188 See I.R.C. § 151(c). 
189 See I.R.C. § 68; § 25A. 
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income tax burden has led to tax benefits for charitable 
contributions, 190 the retention of the personal deduction for home 
mortgage interest, 191 and various business credits and 
deductions, 192 again just to name a few. 
The income tax system is prone to these personalizing 
features, in part, because the annual computation of tax required 
of both businesses and individual taxpayers permits the 
personalizing features to be accounted as an aggregate for the year 
during the annual computation. Each feature in and of itself is 
manageable; however, the combination of features becomes 
burdensome and complicated, often requiring expensive 
professional assistance and, at the very least for many taxpayers, 
computer assistance. 
The third element is the line drawing that must be done to 
determine whether receipts or benefits are income and whether 
expenses are deductible. 193 Often, these determinations must be 
done in the context of receipts and expenditures that occupy some 
middle ground. For example, some expenditures are a mixture of 
business and personal expenses.194 Moreover, some expenses are 
almost purely personal but are reported by taxpayers as deductible 
business expenses.195 Importantly, even if the tax were made 
computationally simple, flat, and unpersonalized, the line drawing 
inherent in measuring income would leave the tax complex and 
costly. 
The fourth element involves the imposition of tax on purely 
financial transactions such as sales or exchanges of investment 
assets. Investment gains from these transactions derived by 
individual taxpayers are not included in the accounting for 
national income and gross domestic product although, under a 
personal income tax system, these gains may increase a taxpayer's 
100 See I.R.C. § 170. 
101 See I.R.C. §163 (h)(3). 
192 See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. 
103 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 139. 
1
"' See, e.g. I.R.C. § 119 (meals and deductions furnished for convenience of employer may 
be considered both personal and business). 
196 The deduction for travel and entertainment expenses under I.R.C. § 162 represents an 
area of both potential and historical abuse. FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 1, at 
262-65. 
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income. 196 Sales of stock, corporate-shareholder transactions such 
as corporate liquidations and redemptions, and certain 
partnership-partner transactions are examples of financial 
transactions that can generate gross income under the current tax 
system. 197 The issues regarding the preference accorded capital 
gains, 198 tax-free corporate reorganizations, 199 and like-kind 
exchanges200 grow out of this aspect of the personal income tax 
system. 
Critics of the income tax have focused on an altemative base 
for the collection of revenue, both to avoid the purported economic 
disincentives to work and save and to achieve more efficiency in 
the tax assessment process.201 However, these critics have often 
conceded that the altemative base may not achieve the fairness, at 
least in the abstract, that the income tax appears to achieve.202 
This paper emphasizes the importance of an efficient and 
inexpensive tax collection system and concludes that an income tax 
that is annual, self-assessed, and imposed directly on the income 
of individuals can never be made efficient and inexpensive. 
VI. ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS OF TAXATION 
A. Alternative Methods of Taxing Consumption 
The use of consumption instead of income as a tax base has 
gained momentum among some tax reformers. 203 Such a system 
190 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Origins of Capital Gains Taxation: What's Law Got to Do 
With It?, 39 SW. L.J. 869, 891 (1985). 
107 See I.R.C. § 302 (distributions in redemption of stock); §331 (distributions to 
shareholders in complete liquidation); § 731 (a) (distributions by a partnership to a partner 
of cash in excess of the partner's basis in partnership interest);§ 741 (sale or exchange of 
partnership interest). 
188 See I.R.C. § 1(h). 
188 See I.R.C. § 368. 
200 See I.R.C. § 1031. 
201 See generally HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 4; Murray Weidenbaum, The Nunn-
Domenici USA Tax: Analysis and Comparisons in FuNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, 54 (1996); 
Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Role of a Value-Added Tax in Fundamental Tax Reform in 
FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, 70 (1996); Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Saving and Consumption 
Taxation: The Federal Retail Sales Tax Example, FuNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, 160 (1996). 
202 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 171. 
,.. See supra note 201. 
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taxes current consumption, i.e., the quantity of commodities sold 
to or consumed by an individual. In contrast, an income tax 
imposes a tax burden on potential consumption, which includes 
both current consumption and the savings available for future 
consumption. 
Proponents of a consumption tax contend that a change from 
a graduated rate income tax to a consumption tax will encourage 
saving and increase the amount of capital stock available for 
investment, thereby increasing productivity and output. 204 
Increased saving will result from a reduced disincentive to save205 
and a shift in the tax burden from high income taxpayers, who 
tend to have high savings rates, to low income taxpayers, who tend 
to have low savings rates.206 As discussed earlier in this paper, the 
first of these outcomes, although perhaps intuitively likely, is open 
to substantial question.207 . The second outcome results from a 
redistribution of the tax burden from the wealthy to the less 
wealthy, which many are likely to find unacceptable even taking 
into account the additional savings that may result, at least in the 
absence of compensating public expenditures benefitting the less 
wealthy. 208 
The principle altemative methods of imposing a consumption 
tax are (1) a national retail sales tax; (2) a value-added tax; (3) the 
Hall-Rabushka flat tax; and (4) a cash-flow or consumed income 
tax. 
1. Retail Sales Tax 
A retail sales tax imposes a tax on the purchase of 
commodities, which could include labor.209 A general sales tax 
""' See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 71; Weidenbaum, supra note 201, at 59-62; 
Metcalf, supra note 201, at 98-100; Kotlik.off, supra note 201, at 176-77. · 
"'" See id. 
"'" See, e.g. SLEMROD & BAKJJA, supra note 4, at 171-73 (lower income taxpayers need to 
consume a larger proportion of their income to live, therefore will have lower savings rates 
than wealthier taxpayers; thus lower income taxpayers will bear a greater burden for tax 
under a consumption model). 
207 See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 390; SLEMROD & BAKJJA, supra note 4, at 110 (illustrating 
where a consumption tax could have a negative impact on saving). 
200 See supra notes 68 and 206. 
209 See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 441. 
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imposes that tax at a uniform rate. 210 In contrast to a general sales 
tax, a selective sales tax or excise tax is levied at different rates 
(including zero) on different commodities. 211 A uniform rate 
national sales tax, however, is much simpler to administer than a 
sales tax involving differential rates in that it is easier to collect 
and easier to police. 212 
The national sales tax under consideration is generally 
described as an ad valorum tax. 213 Sales at stages earlier than the 
retail level are not subject to the tax.214 This exemption of non-
retail sales avoids the cascading effect of tax imposed at each stage 
of production215 and thereby avoids discriminating against non-
vertically integrated companies in favor of vertically integrated 
companies.216 Imposing the tax on the gross amount of retail sales 
ensures that all of the component costs of production (i.e., raw 
materials, labor, etc.) as well as returns on capital (i.e., interest, 
rent, and profits) will be in the tax base because they will be 
reflected in the price of the product. 
As discussed earlier, a single rate national sales tax does not 
guarantee the elimination of excess burdens. 217 Because different 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 442 (selective sales tax also referred to as "an excise tax, or a differential 
commodity tax). 
212 See Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Saving and Consumption Taxation: The Federal Retail Sales 
Tax Example, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 160, 170, (Michael J. Boskin ed. 1996) 
(describing the general features of the retail sales tax); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, 
at 196 (providing an overview of the functioning of the retail sales tax). 
210 See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 442 (an ad valorem tax is calculated based on the 
percentage of the purchase price); Kotlikoff, supra note 212, at 176 (describing a tax based 
on a percentage of purchase price). 
21
• See Malcolm Gillis, Peter Mieskowski, & George R. Zodrow,Indirect Consumption 
Taxes: Common Issues and Differences Among Alternative Approaches, 51 TAXL. REV. 725, 
731 (1996) (contrasting the retail sales tax, which does not tax business inputs, with the 
business transfer tax and the value-added tax methods); Alan Schenk, The Plethora of 
Consumption Tax Proposals: Putting the Value Tax, Flat Tax, Retail Sales Tax, and USA 
Tax Into Perspective, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1281, 1315 (noting that a feature of the retail 
sales tax is to refrain from taxing purchases by businesses for resale). 
215 See SCHENK, supra note 214, at 1315 (discussing the effect of cascading). See also 
Joseph Isenbergh, The End of Income Taxation, 45 TAXL. REV. 283,332 (1990) (discussing 
the impact of cascading on consumers); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 209 (detailing 
the distorting effect of cascading on consumers). 
218 ld. 
217 See supra, note 99 and accompanying text. 
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commodities face different demand structures, a uniform rate does 
not assure that the marginal excess burden imposed on each 
commodity will be equal. Consequently, an excess burden may 
occur. 
The conventional argument against a national sales tax is that 
it would be regressive. 218 The reasoning for this view is that 
wealthy people consume a smaller portion of their income than less 
wealthy people. It would follow that a tax based on consumption 
will be paid by poor people at a disproportionately higher rate 
relative to income than by wealthy people.219 
However, this line of reasoning assumes that the current 
year's income is an accurate reflection of a taxpayer's lifetime 
income. Further, it is not at all certain that over a lifetime, a poor 
person pays a disproportionately larger share of her income for 
consumption expenditures than a wealthy person. 220 In fact, there 
is reasonably strong evidence that people at all levels of income 
devote about the same proportion of their income to consumption 
expenditures.221 If this is the case, a sales tax is neither regressive 
nor progressive over a taxpayer's lifetime. 
In addi~ion, the conventional view looks only at the legal 
incidence of the sales tax. It ignores the analysis of the economic 
incidence of a tax. Although the legal incidence of a sales tax falls 
on sellers, it appears to fall on consumers immediately through an 
increase in price. However, a tax on goods is shifted and shared 
between buyers and sellers of the good, depending upon the 
elasticities of supply and demand for the good. 222 To the extent the 
seller bears a portion of the burden, the tax may again be shifted 
118 See, e.g. Stephen Moore, The Economic and Civil Liberties Case for a National Sales 
Tax, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 110,117 (Michael Boskin ed. 1996). 
••• See MOORE, supra note 218, at 117 (noting the argument against the retail sales tax 
based on progressivity and offering different solutions based on rebates and credits); 
Kotlikoff, supra note 212, at 171; Gillis et al., supra note 214, at 734 (noting the concerns 
voiced about the adverse impact on the poor from the administration of a consumption tax). 
220 See KOTUKOFF, supra note 218, at 171(arguing for the measurement of progressivity 
of the retail sales tax of lifetime rather than annual income); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra 
note 4, at 219 (noting that consumption taxes such as the retail sales tax and the value 
added tax imparts a burden to taxpayers in proportion to their lifetime incomes). 
111 See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 445, citing METCALF, THE LIFETIME INCIDENCE OF STATE 
AND LoCAL TAXES: MEASURING CHANGES DURING THE 1980'S (National Bureau of Econ. 
Research Working Paper No. 4252, Jan. 1993). 
111 See supra, notes 52-92 and accompanying text .. 
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to factors of production for the good, including owners of capital as 
well as labor. As a result, the distributional effect of a national 
sales tax is uncertain. 
Detractors of the sales tax suggest that without an army of 
administrators to monitor its collection and payment to the 
government, any savings resulting from the surface simplicity of 
the tax would be outweighed by the loss of tax revenue from 
cheating.223 Under the methods of collection of the sales tax 
currently employed in an economy that uses currency as a 
significant medium of exchange, loss of revenue through lack of 
compliance is potentially substantial. 
2. Value-Added Tax 
A value-added tax (VAT) is, in substance, a form of a retail 
sales tax. 224 Its advantages over a retail sales tax lie in its 
compliance properties and its built-in protection from evasion. 225 
A VAT is collected in stages.226 Each producer pays a tax on the 
value added to the product being sold. 227 The tax is implemented 
by means of a tax imposed at the full rate on the full value of the 
product when sold at retail.228 Thus, the price of the product to the 
consumer includes the tax computed by applying the VAT rate to 
the·tax-exclusive price of the product or service.229 
Under a credit-style VAT, the retail seller is permitted a credit 
against the tax that must be remitted upon retail sale of the 
223 See SLEMROD & BAKJJA, supra note 4, at 210 (discussing the enormous enforcement 
challenges inherent in the retail sales tax model); MOORE, supra note 212, at 117 (Michael 
Boskin ed. 1996) (recognizing the evasion argun:ient against the retail sales tax and arguing 
that states should be held responsible to collect the tax); SCHENK, supra note 214, at 1315 
(noting the difficulty of enforcement and collection of the retail sales tax and positing that 
problem of enforcement in the retail sales tax paradigm may be solved with the cooperation 
of states). 
224 See DAVID F. BRADFORD, FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN ~ONSUMPI'ION TAXATION 7 (1996). 
223 See Alan Schenk, Value Added Tax: Does This Consumption Tax Have a Place .in the 
Federal Tax System?, 7 VA. TAX REV. 207, 285 (1987). 
228 See Alan Schenk, Radical Tax Reform for the 21"' Century: The Role for a Consumption 
Tax, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 133, 139 (1999). 
227 See id. 
228 See id. at 139-140. 
229 Seeid. 
HeinOnline -- 20 Va. Tax Rev. 37 2000-2001
2000] The Transition to a Currency-Free Economy 37 
product. 230 The credit equals the VAT that the seller paid for raw 
materials, which was included in the price paid by the seller. 231 In 
this manner, the retail seller is required only to remit a net tax 
payment equivalent to the VAT rate times the value which the 
retail seller added to the product.232 Thus, a credit style VAT 
collects a tax at each stage of production through ultimate retail 
sale, but the aggregate amount of tax collected is no greater than 
the amount that would be collected as a retail sales tax at the final 
sale.233 To the extent the ultimate retail seller fails to pay over the 
VAT portion of a sale, it will not be entitled to its credit.234 Only 
the tax on the retailer's mark-up will be lost.235 
A subtraction-style VAT is collected at each stage of 
production, but the tax due at each stage is computed by 
multiplying the VAT rate by the excess of the gross receipts over 
deductible expenditures of the payor.236 The cost of raw materials· 
and capital are deductible in computing value added. 237 In 
contrast, the cost of labor and returns on capital are not 
deductible.238 Facially, a subtraction style VAT resembles the 
corporate income tax, except that investments are expensed and no 
deduction is allowed for labor and interest costs. 239 
Both types of VATs may properly be viewed as alternative 
methods for collecting a retail sales tax and both impose tax on a 
consumption base. 240 Like a retail sales tax, a VAT can be imposed 
210 See METCALF, supra note 201, at 93-94; Schenk, Radical Tax Reform, supra note 226, 
at 139-40 . 
... ld. 
232 See Schenk, Radical Tax Reform, supra note 226, at 139-140 . 
... See id . 
... See METCALF, supra note 201, at 96 . 
... Id. 
... See Schenk, Radical Tax Reform, supra note 226, at 94. 
137 See generally U.S. DEP'r OF TREAsURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH, vol. 3 (1984) The cost of capital is only fully deductible in a 
consumption style VAT, not a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or Income Type VAT. Id. at 
5-7 . 
... See id. See also METCALF, supra note 201, at 92 (value added includes the value of 
labor and return to capital, so would be included in the tax base) . 
... See U.S. DEP'r OF TREAsURY, supra note 237, at 7-8; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 
4, at 197-99. 
140 See Schenk, Value Added Tax, supra note 225, at 226. 
HeinOnline -- 20 Va. Tax Rev. 38 2000-2001
38 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 20:1 
at different rates for different commodities, but a non-uniform rate 
of taxation increases administrative complexity and the cost of 
compliance. 241 A progressive rate may introduce potential 
additional inefficiencies, although this latter point is by no means 
certain. 242 Because the taxes are incorporated in the price of the 
product to be paid by the consumer, and the seller is charged with 
the obligation of paying the tax to the government, the retail sales 
tax and both styles of VAT impose the legal incidence of the tax on 
businesses. As discussed earlier, the imposition of the legal 
incidence of the tax on the seller does not ensure or even indicate 
that the economic incidence of the tax is borne by the seller. 243 Note 
that a VAT can also be imposed on an income base.244 
Transition problems presented by alternative consumption 
proposals vary significantly. An indirect tax such as a VAT or 
retail sales tax will cause a one-time increase in price levels and, 
therefore, a one-time devaluation of existing wealth. 245 The 
transition loss to capital by virtue of its reduced purchasing power 
may be an appropriate trade-off for the preferential treatment that 
it would receive in the future. 
3. Hall-Rabushka Flat Tax 
The Hall-Rabushka flat tax is a consumption tax with 
collection aspects similar, at least in part, to an income tax.246 In 
essence, the Hall-Rabuska flat tax is a subtraction·type VAT with 
a special allowance as a deduction for compensation for services. 247 
The amount paid as compensation for services, however, does not 
escape the consumption tax base but rather is includable on the 
special tax return of the taxpayers who receive the 
241 See id. at 237. 
242 See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 237, at 90-110 9(discussing the impact of 
different ways of making the VAT more progressive). 
... See supra, notes 52-92 and accompanying text. 
244 That possibility will be discussed infra at part VI. B . 
... See David F. Bradford, Consumption Taxes: Some Fundamental Transition Issues, in 
FRONTIERSOFTAXREFORM 123, 135 (Michael Boskin ed. 1996); Schenk, Value Added Tax, 
supra note 225, at 237; Gillis et al., supra note 214, at 751-752. 
248 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 8. 
247 See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 55. 
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compensation.248 Thus, in theory, the economic incidence of the 
Hall-Rabushka flat tax is the same as that of a VAT, even though 
the legal incidence of the portion attributable to compensation for 
personal services is imposed upon the individual service 
providers. 249 
The shift in the legal incidence of the Hall-Rabushka flat tax 
and the place where personal services tax is collected, permits the 
taxation of personal services income to be imposed at a different 
rate and on less than all of the taxpayer's personal service 
income.250 Thus, the Hall-Rabushka flat tax modification of a 
subtraction-type VAT permits flexibility insofar as the tax 
attributable to personal service income can be made progressive 
and can include a low income allowance, permitting some low paid 
workers to escape that portion of the tax altogether.251 
Because the precise form of the Hall-Rabushka flat tax 
proposal does not take advantage of the complete flexibility to 
impose the tax on personal services in a progressive manner, as 
that term is normally used by income tax advocates, 252 it leaves the 
economic incidence of the VAT largely unchanged.253 However, it 
could be modified (undoubtedly without the consent ofMessrs. Hall 
and Rabushka) to be more progressive. 
Transition issues under the Hall-Rabushka Flat Tax are 
similar to those under the indirect consumption taxes discussed 
previously. 
4. Cash Flow Consumed Income Tax 
The last type of consumption tax imposes legal incidence on 
individuals instead of businesses. The cash flow tax is computed 
and collected at the individuallevel.254 The taxpayer includes all 
248 See id. 
249 See id. at 60. 
,.. See id. at 59. 
261 See id. 
262 See, e.g. SCHENK, supra note 214, at 1299, 1313 (comparing the VAT and the Hall & 
Rabushka flat tax). 
... See HALL & BABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 81 (discussing variants on the flat tax and its 
effects on rates). 
264 See generally ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 1120. 
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income, both from labor as well as from capital, and subtracts 
savings. 255 The amount remaining after the subtraction constitutes 
the taxpayer's consumption and is subject to the tax. 256 
Administratively, this type of consumption tax is problematic 
since a method must be devised to establish the amount of a 
taxpayer's savings. The likely solution would be to designate 
qualified accounts at savings banks, security brokerage houses, 
and other types of financial institutions to track these savings. 257 
As long as capital gains were retained in those accounts, no tax 
would be imposed. Withdrawals from these accounts that are not 
offset by contributions to the same or other qualified accounts, 
however, would be added to the tax base and subject to tax. 
Under the cash flow tax, the taxation of consumption can be 
personalized. Thus, the rates can be made progressive, the tax can 
contain various exemptions and deductions for special 
circumstances, and the tax system is as susceptible to built-in tax 
incentives, known as tax expenditures, as the current tax 
system. 258 For that reason, the cash flow tax is likely to encounter 
the same criticisms of expensive administration and inefficiency as 
the current income tax. 
Transition issues in moving to a consumed income tax are 
quite significant. A consumed income tax would be very dependent 
upon an honest accounting for wealth existing at the time of its 
adoption. Otherwise, the tax would be easily avoidable through 
post-enactment savings derived from unreported but existing 
wealth. Accounting for that existing wealth as of the time of 
adoption to ensure that it does not appear as new savings, as well 
as accounting for the basis of assets that are currently owned by 
individuals, present great transition problems . 
... ld. at 1149 . 
... [d. 
257 See, e.g. Robert A. O'Neill & Paul H. Lutz, Unlimited Sauings Allowance (USA) Tax 
System, 66 TAX NOTES 1482, 1522 (1995) (Describing the type of form which would be used 
to keep track of savings and investments) . 
.,. See, e.g. DOMENICI, supra note 3, at 296. 
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B. Reconciling National Income Accounting with 
the Consumption Tax and Income Tax 
41 
1. Relationship of Taxation to the Flow of Goods and Services 
Because each of the various consumption tax proposals chooses 
a different place in the production and sale of goods cycle to impose 
the tax, the best way to understand the consumption tax reform 
proposals is to understand first the flow of goods ru;td services and 
the factors of production. The selection of the point of imposition 
of the tax determines how the base is calculated, the 
proportionality of the tax, and how the tax can be collected, but it 
does not itself determine who ultimately bears the burden of the 
tax, i.e. its economic incidence (assuming equivalent tax rates are 
employed). 
By definition, national income (Y) and domestic product are 
equal. That is because domestic product represents the firms' 
response to aggregate demand for goods and services, whether 
arising from consumers (C), investors (1), the government (G) or 
net exports, i.e. exports (X) minus imports (IM) or (X - IM).259 
Production equal to the domestic product satisfies that aggregate 
demand.260 The amount of the domestic product, when paid out to 
the factors of production and as profits, represents income to those 
recipients. 261 Thus, when wages, interests, rents, and profits in the 
economy are combined to compute national income, that amount 
equals the value of the output in the economy, which in turn, 
equals the aggregate demand for goods and services.262 
The income tax for the most part is imposed on national 
income, i.e., wages, interest, rents and profits. If one desired to 
impose a tax on consumption alone, however, one could tax 
national income in the hands of its recipients, excluding the 
amount that recipients save (Y - 8). The cash flow consumed 
... See ABEL & BERNANKE, supra note 52, at 31-32. 
280 See id. at 31, 309. 
281 See id. at 31-32. 
282 See id. 
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income tax and its recent legislative reflection, the "Nunn-
Domenici USA Tax", employ this approach.263 
Alternatively, one could tax income or consumption by focusing 
on aggregate demand. Specifically, one could impose a tax on 
private consumption by taxing aggregate demand less investment 
and government spending.264 The tax would be incorporated into · 
the prices of goods that were consumed: The retail sales tax 
(which excludes business purchases) as well as the credit and 
subtraction method consumption VATs employ this latter 
approach. 
The foregoing method can be used to impose an income tax as 
well. One could tax income by imposing an ad valorem tax on 
aggregate demand, including consumer demand, investment 
demand, government purchases, and net exports. This tax could 
be imposed statutorily on the purchasers of domestic product265 or, 
as with regard to most sales taxes and value-added taxes, on the 
sellers of those products, but collected, at least in part, from 
_purchasers. Under this latter method, the tax would be 
incorporated into the prices of the goods and services. 
The primary difference between an income VAT and a 
consumption VAT lies in the treatment of investment 
expenditures. In contrast to a consumption VAT, no deduction or 
credit would be permitted under an income VAT with regard to the 
business firm's purchase of investment goods such as plant and 
equipment.266 In lieu of complete expensing or credit, a 
depreciation allowance, in the case of a subtraction method VAT, 
or amortization of the credit resulting from the purchase of 
investment goods, in the case of a credit VAT, would be allowed. 267 
In either event, net investment would be part of the tax base of the 
business firm, thereby causing the VAT to be an income VAT 
283 The Nunn-Domenici USA Tax employs this approach in part but combines it with a 
separate business tax component in the form of a subtraction style VAT. See S. 722, 10411> 
Cong., l't Sess. (1995), supra note 3. For a succinct description of the proposal, see 
Weidenbaum, supra note 201, at 54. 
... This tax could be imposed with or without net exports and with or without government 
purchases. 
... See supra notes 70-92 and accompanying text. 
288 See U.S. DEJ>'T OF TREAsURY, supra note 237,5-7. 
287 See id. 
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because it imposes a tax on income, not just consumption268 The 
economic incidence of the portion of the tax attributable to 
inclusion of investment expenditures in the tax base would fall on 
the owners of the factors of production, including capital and labor, 
and on consumers, 269 with the exact sharing ratios dependent upon 
elasticities. Moreover, it should be noted that since both private 
and government saving must be equal to investment, disallowing 
a deduction or credit for investment spending under a VAT is the 
counterpart to taxing saving under a personal income tax. 270 The 
legal incidence, however, would be different. 
Finally, an income VAT, coupled with a tax on personal service 
income to the service provider and a credit to the employer to 
achieve progressivity, could be modified into a personal income tax 
by adding a separate tax on gains from sales of investment 
property, i.e., capital gain. An income VAT and separate taxation 
of capital gain, however, do not lend themselves to automatic 
point-of-sale collection. 271 
2. Personal Income Tax and the flow of Goods and Services 
In contrast to the manner of taxing national income described 
above, the income tax system currently in force actually imposes 
a tax on a broader base than national income. 272 The current 
income tax adopts a definition of income different from national 
income. Under the current income tax system, personal income is 
determined at the taxpayer level, and is generally "defined as the 
algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in 
consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of 
property rights between the beginning and end of the period in 
question. "273 This definition, sometimes referred to as the "Haig-
Simons" definition of income, after the economist Robert Haig, who 
208 See id. 
208 See id. at 6-7. 
210 See, e.g. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 71. 
271 See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 44 7. 
212 See I.R.C. § 61(setting forth what is includable as taxable income). 
27
' HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). 
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articulated the definition first in 1921,274 and Henry Simons, who 
modified it in 1938,275 is the most widely accepted definition of 
income and is used by many economists and lawyers as the basis 
for testing the equity of the personal income tax. 276 
Like a tax on national income, the personal income t.ax base 
includes income from wages, interest, rent, and profits when 
realized.277 It also includes, however, some transfers between 
individuals, such as found property, which may or may not be 
deductible by the person who lost the property. 278 More 
importantly, the current income tax system taxes appreciation in 
a taxpayer's property.279 This appreciation can be either 
appreciation in financial assets or appreciation in other investment 
property. 280 Appreciation in financial assets essentially represents 
the present discounted value of the flow of future expected income 
from the property or business entity the ownership of which is 
evidenced by the financial asset. Appreciation can take place 
either because the flow of income from the entity has increased, 
the discount factor has decreased, or the price-earnings multiple 
has increased because of changes in speculative interest in the 
financial asset. Regardless of the reason for the appreciation, the 
current income tax imposes a tax on that appreciation, generally 
at more favorable capital gains rates, when the appreciation has 
been "realized."281 This is true even though the future earnings, 
when realized, would themselves be subject to income tax.282 
. 
274 RO~ERT HAIG, THE CONCEPI' OF INCOME (1921) 
..,. See supra note 272. 
1711 See FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 1, at 107; RoSEN, supra note 52, at 339-
342. 
271 See I.R.C. §61. 
1711 See Treas. Reg. §1.6-14(a) and Cesarini u. United States, 296 F.Supp., 3 (N.D. Ohio, 
1969) affirmed 428 F.2d 812 (found money included in income); I.R.C. § 165(h)(2) 
("treatment of casualty gains and losses:" "net casualty loss allowed only to the extent it 
exceeds 10 percent of adjusted gross income"). 
279 See, e.g. I.R.C. § 1001. 
280 See I.R.C. § 1221. 
281 See I.R.C. § 1(h) 
282 Sometimes, however, a tax on appreciation will offset taxes on future earnings. An 
example is the effect of adjustments under I.R. C. §§ 734(b) and 7 43(b) when a § 754 election 
is in effect for a partnership. Sometimes, on the other hand, no adjustment is made. For 
example, the sale of corporate stock for a profit does not give rise to an upward adjustment 
in the basis of the corporation's assets because there is a separate basis in the stock and a 
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The appropriateness of taxing this appreciation in financial 
assets represents one aspect of the long-running debate regarding 
whether capital gains should be taxed preferentially.283 In any 
event, if an income tax were enacted providing for collection by 
imposing a tax on purchases, a separate capital gains tax would be 
required in order to match the tax base of the current personal 
income tax. 
3. Treatment of Capital Gain 
In contrast to the Haig-Simons definition of personal income 
discussed above,284 the definition of national income from a 
macroeconomic viewpoint stems from the definition of gross 
domestic product. 285 It is the sum of the incomes that all 
individuals in the economy earned in the form of wages, interest, 
rents, and profits.286 The major difference in the two definitions is 
the treatment of gains from financial transactions such as from the 
sale of investment assets. Thus, an individual's gain from the sale 
of stock in a corporation would be includable in income under the 
Haig-Simons definition of income. Such a gain, however, is not 
included in the macroeconomic concept of national income. As a 
result, the current income tax system, which imposes a tax on 
capital gains, captures a broader base than the nation's national 
income when viewed without regard to special exemptions and 
deductions unrelated to the measurement of income 
An indirect tax such as a income VAT would tax gross 
domestic product and, therefore, income in the national income 
context, but would not tax an individual's personal income as 
defined under Haig-Simons. The income VAT, therefore, excludes 
from the tax base appreciation in financial assets like stocks and 
bonds.287 As a result, this reliance on an indirect tax, even an 
separate basis in the assets. See generally I.R.C § § 301, 302, 311. 
283 See, e.g. Martin A. Sullivan, Keeping Score on Class Warfare: Joint Committee on 
Taxation and Treasury are Miles Apart, 84 TAX NOTES 963, 963-65 (1999) (describing how 
preferential capital gains rates are viewed as tax favors to the wealthy). 
,.. See supra notes 271-81 and accompanying text. 
286 See ABEL & BERNANKE, supra note 52, at 31-32 . 
... ld. 
287 See p.S. DEP'TOFTREASURY, supra note 237,5-7. 
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income tax collected solely at the business level, may be subject to 
the charge from the proponents of the current income tax system 
that it fails to fully include income from capital. In particular, an 
income tax collected at the business level does not include 
appreciation of capital in the tax base even if realized, such as, 
realized gain on stock market transactions. 
This exclusion for the appreciation in financial assets 
represents a conceptual difference between income tax based or 
national accounting and the personal income tax. Indeed, it is one 
of the significant disputes that Hall and Rabushka have with the 
current income tax system. 288 Like the personal income tax, 
however, the VAT does not allow a deduction to the purchaser for 
the cost of a financial asset. 289 
A direct consumption tax such as the cash flow consumed 
income tax handles appreciation in financial assets in a slightly 
different manner. It imposes a tax on the gain on financial assets, 
but only when consumed. It does, however allow a deduction for 
the cost of purchasing the assets and, therefore, excludes the 
purchase price from the tax base. 
These two approaches are the same on a present value basis 
under certain simplifying assumptions. In both cases, the tax base 
consists of wages and business profits.290 While these two forms of 
consumption tax may be largely equivalent at the aggregate level, 
they may not be so at the individual level. 291 The tax burdens on 
particular individuals will be dependent upon the taxpayers' tastes 
for, and good fortune with respect to, financial assets. 292 
Adoption of an income VAT would resolve some of the 
preferential treatment of capital by causing the incidence of the tax 
to fall in part on capital. 293 Under an income VAT, income is taxed 
at the business level, and there is no allowable deduction for 
return to capital in the form of either interest or dividends or for 
288 HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 117. 
289 See U.S. DEp'T OF TREASURY, supra note 237,5-7. 
290 See Schenk, Value Added Tax, supra note 225, at 237. 
29
' I d. at 224. 
292 Id. at255. 
293 See U.S. DEFT OF TREASURY, supra note 237,5-7. 
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capital expenditures. 294 This treatment is in contrast to the 
deduction that would be allowed for capital expenditures under a 
subtraction style consumption VAT.295 Investment and, therefore, 
savings would be subjected to this additional tax. 296 
One would suspect that the taxation of returns to capital 
would be reflected in the amount capital users would be willing to 
pay for that capital. Thus, interest and dividend rates would 
reflect the non-deductibility of payments for the use of capital.297 
To the extent that appreciation of equity or debt ownership goes 
untaxed even if realized, there is a justification that these gains at 
the personal level represent merely an anticipation of future 
earnings at the business level that have not yet occurred and, 
therefore, do not actually represent income from a macroeconomic 
perspective.298 In addition, to the extent that the owner of 
appreciated assets sells those assets to a purchaser, the purchaser 
does not get a deduction or amortizable basis for the purchase 
price, 299 so none of the purchase price can be used to produce an 
immediate tax-reducing benefit.300 This aspect of taxation under 
the current system oftentimes represents a double taxation of 
income from capital or at least an acceleration of the taxation on 
that income. As discussed above301 with regard to income that is 
earned by a C corporation or from the sale of stock of such a 
corporation,302 the incidence of such a tax resulting purely from 
operating in the corporate form is uncertain. 
It should be noted, however, that even under the current 
income tax structure, not all capital gains are taxed. In order to be 
'"' See id. 
216 See id . 
... See id. 
2111 Taxation on return to capital may be viewed as an additional "expense" of doing 
business, and thus would be reflected in the market price. See RoSEN, supra note 52, at 
446-48. 
208 See ABEL&BERNANKE, supra note 52, at 31-32 9(income defined from a macroeconomic 
perspective). 
211 See U.S. DEp'TOFTREAsURY, supra note 237,6-7. 
100 ld. 
101 See supra notes 297-301 and accompanying text. See also SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra 
note 4, at 66-67. 
·
102 There is no corporate tax counterpart to a § 754 election and resultant basis 
adjustments under§§ 734(b) and 743(b) to offset future income at the entity level. 
HeinOnline -- 20 Va. Tax Rev. 48 2000-2001
48 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 20:1 
subjected to tax, the gain must be realized, requiring a sale or 
other taxable disposition of the asset. 303 A mere appreciation in 
value or exchange in a non-taxable transaction does not trigger the 
tax. Moreover, under current law, when the owner of appreciated 
. property dies, a beneficiary who receives the property is entitled to 
a date of death stepped-up basis in t~e property. 304 In that 
manner, the appreciation in the property owned by a decedent at 
his death completely escapes income taxation under the current 
law.305 Finally, capital gains, interest, and dividends realized in a 
qualified retirement account, including a Section 401(k) plan, 
Keogh plan, and individual retirement account (IRA), are not 
subject to tax until actually paid to the beneficiary. 306 
VII. PROPOSAL: ELECTRONIC POINT-OF-SALE TAXATION 
A Point-of-Sale Taxation: In General 
This article advocates point-of-sale taxation because 
technological developments in electronic transfers will make such 
taxation inexpensive and largely leakproof. To this end, the article 
proposes that the current system of income tax be replaced by a 
single rate credit type VAT. A single rate retail sales tax 
represents a second choice. Such a tax system would not be 
personalized. As such, burden sharing modifications, if desirable, 
would be made on the expenditure side or by offsetting other taxes 
such as social security taxes. 
B. Method of Collection 
A VAT, as well as a retail sales tax, can be inexpensive, 
accurate and virtually leak-proof in an economy in which money 
transfers take place electronically. To illustrate this point, assume 
a retail purchase transaction using a debit card under a retail sales 
303 See I.R.C. § 1001(b) . 
..,. See I.R.C. § 1014. 
100 ld. (appreciation in assets at death go untaxed due to the stepped up basis the 
beneficiary receives in those assets). 
""" See I.R.C. § 408 (e)(l). 
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tax. When the customer' s debit card is swept, the retail merchant 
in effect gains access to the customer's bank account. The 
appropriate amount, including sales tax, is automatically 
withdrawn from the customer's account. The clearing bank which 
handles the transaction electronically would then make an 
automatic entry, debiting the customer's account for the purchase 
price plus the sales tax, crediting the merchant's account for the 
purchase price, and crediting the government's tax collection 
account for the sales tax. . All of these operations would be 
programmed and be part of the clearing bank's normal operations. 
A credit card transaction would operate in much the same way 
from the consumer's and the merchant's point of view. The only 
difference would be that the clearing batik would charge the 
customer's credit account for that amount, thereby establishing a 
lending transaction, rather than make an immediate withdrawal 
from the customer's account. The customer's account would be 
charged with both the purchase price and the appropriate sales 
tax. As in the debit transaction, the sales tax would be 
immediately credited to the federal government's tax collection 
account. In that manner, the tax collection would be automatic. 
A credit type VAT would operate in much the same manner. 
The consumer would observe no difference from a sales tax. The 
seller, however, would be entitled to a credit on the VAT previously 
paid. Records of the seller's allowable credit would have been kept 
by virtue of the financial institution's reporting of the VAT paid on 
the seller's initial purchase. 
A numerical example will illustrate the mechanics of the tax 
collection. A retail purchase made by credit card would 
automatically include the sales tax, say 20%. When the credit or 
debit card is used for the purchase, an amount equal to 120% of the 
original purchase price of the item can be subtracted from the debit 
cardholder's account or charged to the credit cardholder's account. 
At that time, the 20% portion of the charge can be credited 
immediately to a tax collection account of the government at the 
financial institution conducting the electronic bookkeeping. In the 
case of a VAT, the charge would be bookmarked to identify the 
purchaser for later credit. The account can be swept ·either 
immediately or at the end of each day to a federal reserve account. 
The procedure would.be exactly the same, regardless of whether a 
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debit card or a credit card was used. In both cases, the tax 
assessed at the point-of-sale would be immediately charged to the 
purch~ser and credited to the government's account. 
The essential difference between a VAT and a retail sales tax 
in terms of mechanics of collection is that under a retail sales tax, 
the automatic payment method described above would be the end 
ofthe process. In contrast, under a VAT, the seller would have to 
be given credit separately for the VAT it paid to its suppliers of 
raw materials. As illustrated above, the credit process would 
involve an additional step to complete the tax collection process. 
But, as discussed earlier, it would reduce the risks of evasion 
because the failure to collect the tax at the point of the retail sale 
would result in forfeiture of the credit and therefore involve a 
smaller loss of revenue than would be the loss under a retail sales 
tax.307 It would also avoid the evasion of tax that could result from 
a buyer mischaracterizing a purchase as a business purchase, upon 
which no sales tax is due, instead of as a consumption purchase. 
Under a VAT, the purchaser would be required to make that 
mischaracterization to the government in claiming its credit, 
thereby making the claim easier for the government to review and 
verify. 
It is anticipated that most retail transactions would be 
undertaken with either a credit card or a debit card. In some 
cases, however, the customer may desire a more de-personalized 
method of payment. For example, a taxpayer may desire 
confidentiality with regard to her purchases. This confidentiality 
can be achieved by allowing the customer to purchase a Stored 
Value Card. Furthermore, to prevent the substitution of these 
Stored Value Cards for currency, which.could be used to avoid the 
sales tax, the holder's personal identification attribute, 308 such as, 
currently a PIN and later a thumb print or retinal image, would be 
required to transfer funds from the unnamed account accessed by 
the card. 
301 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
108 Currently, a personal identification number (PIN) is used. However, one can imagine 
that a thumb print or retinal image may be substituted as soon as technology allows. See, 
e.g. Sifers, supra note 9, at 714, 724-25 (describing security measures for smart cards). 
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In addition, cash cards could be used for small incidental 
purchases, such as to satisfy a parking meter. Cash cards would 
be printed with magnetic strips like Washington Metro fare 
cards.309 They would be subject to a sales tax when purchased. 
For example, assuming a sales tax of 20%, the customer could 
purchase a $100 bearer cash card by having $120 debited to the 
customer's account. The customer would only have the actual 
c 
amount of the purchase subtracted from the balance on the card. 
Correspondingly, the merchant would keep the entire proceeds of 
the sale, because the government had already received its sales tax 
when the customer purchased the cash card. 
The key to enjoying the speed and convenience of stored value 
and cash cards without facilitating the easy avoidance of tax is to 
ensure that the cards themselves cannot become a medium of 
exchange. This can be accomplished by personalizing the cards to 
make them usable by only the purchaser and by preventing 
transfer of the value embedded in the card to another card. 
This system is also adaptable to an econon;ty in which some 
transactions still take place using cash. In those transactions, the 
merchant would be required to record the transaction in the same 
manner as a debit or credit card transaction, but would direct the 
p9:yment of tax electronically from its own funds. The merchant 
would have already collected from the customer a sufficient 
amount of cash to pay the tax. This payment of tax could occur 
automatically by the merchant electronically reporting the sale as 
a cash transaction. Tax collection on cash transactions, 
accordingly, would be heavily dependent upon compliance by the 
merchant. As cash payments are replaced in the economy by 
electronic payments, however, compliance issues would decline. 
This article advocates a credit style VAT over a retail sales tax 
because the VAT collects tax at all stages of production and is 
therefore less easily evaded. In other respects, however, a retail 
sales tax lends itself to automatic point-of-sale implementation as 
1011 For example, in Washington, D.C., metro riders purchase debit fare cards and put a 
certain amount of cash on the card. The rider inserts the card upon entry into the station, 
and then reinserts the card upon departure. The amount debited is based upon the distance 
traveled. 
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well as a VAT. Disregarding this one point, arguments made in 
favor of a VAT should apply equally to a retail sales tax. 
C. Estimated Cost of System 
The cost of a credit card transaction now ranges, generally, 
between 2 and 3 percent of the amount of the transaction, 
depending upon the value of the transaction and the type of 
business.310 Two percent of the $750 billion revenue collected311 
equals $15 billion. To this amount should be added the costs of 
ensuring compliance and auditing the application ofVAT credits. 
If the full staff of the Service were employed performing these 
functions, a rather unlikely prospect, the additional cost would not 
exceed $5 billion. 312 The aggregate cost of $20 billion represents 
approximately 2.67% of the revenue collected. 
This cost, a dead-weight loss to be sure, compares very 
favorably to the cost of revenue raising under the current income 
tax system of10 percent as estimated by Slemrod,313 based upon an 
overall cost of$75 billion, and extremely favorably to a cost of30%, 
based upon Payne's analysis of the ADL data.314 Moreover, as 
electronic funds transfer technology develops, the cost of this 
system is likely to decline. Thus, it is likely that the proposal will 
reduce revenue collection costs substantially, principally by 
eliminating much of the taxpayer compliance and tax planning 
costs incurred under the current tax system. 
D. Possible Modification of Point-of-Sale Taxation 
to Personalize Some Aspects of the Tax 
If some personalizing of the tax were desired, however, the 
single rate credit style VAT or retail sales tax could be coupled 
110 See SOLOMON, supra note 5, at 56. 
111 This amount is based upon Slem.rod's assertion that his estimate of $75 billion for 
administration costs equals approximately 10% of the revenue collected. See Slemrod, 
Which is the Simplest Tax System, supra note 149, at 368. 
'" See id. at 64 (I.R.S. budget devoted to income tax is $5 billion) . 
• ,. See id. at 368; see also supra, notes 149-77 and accompanying text. This is based upon 
an overall cost of $75 billion. 
314 See supra, notes 149-77 and accompanying text. 
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with shifting of the legal incidence of the portion of the tax on 
personal services to workers. This point can best be illustrated by 
assuming a credit type VAT system with the exception that wages. 
are subject to the VAT. A business paying wages would be entitled 
to a credit for the VAT on those wages against the VAT collected 
upon sale of its products. No separate withholding, however, 
would have to be made with regard to wages. Instead, only an 
accounting of previously credited taxes paid as a VAT by the 
business would be required. The taxes paid by the business firm 
would become the taxes paid on behalf of the employee and would 
be credited to the employee's account. 
The employee would compute a tax on her wage income at a 
flat rate, for which the VAT collected from her employer would be 
available as a refundable credit against any wage income tax 
liability. In concept, the VAT collected with regard to wages would 
serve as tax withheld on her wage income. Under a system of 
electronic payments, the VAT amount with respect to wages would 
be credited, automatically and electronically, to a tax payment 
from the employee on wages through a withholding account for the 
individual employee. As a result, when the employee reports her 
income, she will also report the VAT credited to her account by the 
business firm that paid the compensation. If the VAT rate charged 
to the employer and the income tax rate assessed on the employee 
were the same, no additional payments would be required. If the 
VAT charged to the employer exceeded the employees wage income 
tax liability, the employee would be entitled to a refund, and if the 
wage income tax liability exceeded the VAT, additional tax would 
be due from the employee. 
For example, assume a VAT or retail sales tax of 20%. If the 
company that has collected the tax pays wages in the amount of 
$100, that $100 wage income could be made taxable to the 
employee. The employee, however, would be entitled to a 
refundable credit equal to the VAT or sales tax that had been paid 
by the employer with regard to the employee's wages. 
Conceptually, this amount can be viewed as the amount collected 
by the employer from its customer with respect to that $100. That 
amount, $20, represents the VAT on the portion of the employer's 
sale price attributable to the employee's wage. Thus, if the 
employee's income from personal services was less than the 
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applicable low income allowance or zero tax amount, no additional 
tax would be due and, depending upon the rate structure, some of 
the tax credit could be refunded to the employee. On the other 
hand, if the employee's wage income was high and the applicable 
tax rate on such income exceeded 20%, the employee would still 
have additional tax liability after taking into account the $20 
credit. (It should be noted that the wage earner's tax could be 
computed with or without a gross-up of the $20; the choice would 
simply reflect the desired effective rate of the tax on the employee.) 
In this manner, by engrafting a wage tax onto the VAT or sales 
tax, the tax system could be personalized for wage earners even 
though substantially all of the tax due would have been collected 
at the point-of-sale by means of a VAT or sales tax. 
This system could be implemented in a slightly different way. 
The wage earner's tax could be enacted as an income tax on wages 
subject to employer withholding. The employer, in turn, could be 
allowed a VAT credit for wage taxes withheld. This system would 
function mechanically, however, in the same manner for the 
employer as the payment of a VAT on wages. The wage 
withholding on the personal services income of an employee would 
generate a credit to the employer company, but a like amount 
would be subtracted from the employee's wages and automatically 
paid to the government. If the employee were then taxed on a base 
measured by wages in a manner similar to a personalized income 
tax, allowing personal exemptions, a low income allowance, and 
graduated rates, then the withholding with respect to the 
employee's wages would serve as an offset to her wage income tax. 
This amount could be refunded for a low wage employee (figured 
as an aggregate of all of the employee's wages for the year). A high 
wage employee would have to pay additional tax if his tax liability 
exceeded the withheld amount. 
Both conceptualizations described above are economically 
equivalent. They differ only in the technical description and legal 
incidence of the tax on wage earnings. In the first system, the 
legal incidence of the tax is on the employer, and the tax paid by 
the employer is available, computationally, as a refundable credit 
to the employee. In the second system, the legal incidence of the 
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tax is on the employee, but the tax is satisfied automatically 
through withholding by the employer.315 
The alternatives described above differ from the Hall-
Rabushk.a flat tax structure in that they employ a credit method 
VAT instead of the subtraction type VAT advocated by Hall and 
Rabushk.a. Consequently, they facilitate point-of-sale taxation 
while still allowing for greater progressivity due to increased 
flexibility in the taxation of personal services. 
Both the single rate credit type VAT or the VAT coupled with 
the collection of personal service tax from the service provider . 
would be consistent with the objectives discussed in the article, 
because under both systems, collection of and accounting for the 
tax would take place solely or substantially at the point of 
payment, whether for sale of goods or non-employee compensation 
for services. The modification with regard to the personal services 
of employees, of course, would personalize the tax somewhat, but 
it would also add a corresponding layer of administration and 
attendant costs because it could not be achieved automatically. 
The trade-off between cost control and personalizing the tax is a 
fundamental issue that must be addressed in evaluating taxation 
at point-of-sale and is discussed in more detail in Section F of this 
part. 
As a third alternative employing point-of-sale taxation, an 
income tax VAT could be adopted. While not advocated in this 
paper, it would nevertheless be much less expensive to administer 
. and therefore preferable to the current personal income tax. Both 
the income tax VAT and the subtraction type consumption VAT 
depend upon annual accounting, in contrast to the credit type VAT, 
which is transactional. In addition, a credit type VAT is to some 
degree self policing. Each purchaser has an incentive to see that 
his immediate seller reports the transaction and pays the VAT in 
order that the purchaser can receive credit for the VAT paid. 
Principally for these reasons, the income VAT and the subtraction 
type VAT are inferior to the credit type VAT in a system that 
involves point-of-sale assessment and collection of the tax . 
• ,. The reader should recognize the equivalence by reference to the previously discussed 
gas station hypothetical. See supra, notes 54-67 and accompanying text. 
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E. Special Circumstances 
The system described above appears simple, straightforward, 
secure, and relatively inexpensive to administer for everyday sales 
of goods and payment for services. Special circumstances, 
however, may require some modifications to the general 
procedures. 
1. Used Property 
Under the VAT proposal, the sale of used property other than 
financial assets would be subject to tax. Ordinarily, however, 
tangible property such as used automobiles and household 
appliances are unlikely to increase in value, so imposing a tax on 
the sale of those items would amount to double taxation of the 
items since a tax was paid when the items were originally 
purchased by the seller. Thus, under a VAT, a credit would be 
allowed for tax previously paid on used property that is 
subsequently re-sold. The credit, which would be non-refundable, 
would usually obviate the need for collecting an additional sales 
tax. Under a credit style VAT, the credit would theoretically be 
automatic; although, as a practical matter, consumers who sell 
used property would be unlikely to have procedures established to 
make automatic use of it. 
In some circumstances, however, used property appreciates. 
An example of appreciating property would be artwork. In that 
case, in order to avoid double taxation or cascading of tax, a credit 
would be allowed for tax previously paid by the seller, which would 
offset some but not all of the VAT due upon the subsequent sale. 
Collection of the tax on the sale of used property would not be 
as easy as collection from a taxpayer engaged in the business of 
retail selling. In the case of the VAT as applied to retail sellers 
and intermediate goods producers, electronic transactions would 
be the norm, and the mechanism for collecting the tax would be 
automatic and inexpensive. In the case of the casual seller, on the 
other hand, a payment of any substantial amount would eventually 
also be electronic, but the automatic imposition of a sales tax on 
the gross amount would not permit the subtraction of the credit. 
It may be that record keeping of the credit would be required with 
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the justification that casual sales of property are not commonplace 
occurrences. Alternatively, the mechanics of the process cart be 
solved for certain kinds of property. For example, property such as 
automobiles could be subjected to federal tax upon registration in 
the same manner that they are currently subjected to state sales 
tax. 
Finally, the availability ofthe credit may need to be sacrificed 
in order to achieve a simpler system. Arguably, in the interests of 
simplification, casual resales should not be subjected to tax. The 
benefits from simplification would have to be weighed against the 
possibility of complete avoidance of the VAT (pre~?umably, however, 
only on value added by the immediate seller) by retail sellers who 
sell indirectly to customers through intermediaries acting in the 
guise of a purchaser and casual seller. Accordingly, the proposal 
made in this paper would be implemented best by seeking to tax 
resales and allowing a credit for previous tax paid, the records for 
which should be available electronically. Alternatively, the extra 
burden of cascading (VAT without credit for tax previously paid) 
may have to be endured by the casual reseller. 
2. Personal Residences 
The VAT proposal, similar to the national retail sales tax that 
has been proposed by Congressmen Schaefer (R-Colo) and Tauzin 
(R-La) (NST Proposal,)316 could impose a tax on the purchaser of a 
primary residence, but allow the purchaser to elect to pay the tax 
over thirty years, with interest. This treatment is in contrast to 
the purchase of other residences used for consumption, under the 
NST Proposal, for which sales tax would be due upon purchase, but 
which could be financed privately.317 In the event the election to 
"" The National Retail Sales Tax Act of 1996 H.R. 3039, 104th Cong. (1996). The NST 
proposal is explored in great detail in DAVID R. BURTON & DAN R. MAsTROMARCO, 
EMANCIPATING AMERICA FROM THE INCOME TAX- HOW THE NATIONAL SALES TAX WOULD 
WORK (Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 272, 1997) ("Burton & Mastromarco No. 1"). See 
also David R. Burton & Dan R. Mastromarco, The National Sales Tax: Moving Beyond the 
Idea, 71 TAX NOTES 1237, 1244 (1996) ("Burton & Mastromarco No. 2"). The authors 
provide a specific methodology regarding how the NST would operate in practice. The 
discussion contained in this section of the article advocates their suggestion ofhow the NST 
would be implemented. 
317 BURTON & MAsTROMARCO No. 1, supra note 316, at 17-18. 
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defer payment of the ta.X is made with respect to the primary 
residence, the full amount would become due upon resale of the 
home.318 Consistent with an attempt to avoid cascading, a 
purchaser of the home should be permitted a credit for the tax 
previously paid by the seller. 319 The transaction would be recorded 
in county land records, so verification of the allowable credit 
should not be difficult. 320 
In contrast to the treatment of a first time purchase of a home, 
the retail sales tax proposal would allow a present homeowner who 
purchases a replacement home to apply the amount of tax 
previously paid o~ her first house as a credit against the tax due 
on her second house. 321 Consistency would seem to indicate having 
the credit run with the house rather than with the homeowner.322 
The-homeowner would, nevertheless, obtain benefit from the credit 
because she would be able to sell the house to a subsequent 
purchaser who would be relieved of the obligation of paying the tax 
up to the amount of the credit. 323 In that way the credit could be 
included in the price of the house upon resale.324 
In any event, because of the size of the transaction and its 
importance to the participants, as well as the usual participation 
of financial intermediaries, the automatic electronic payment of 
the applicable tax would not create an additional administrative 
burden of any significance. 325 
3. Mixed-Use Property 
Under a sales tax, great importance is placed on whether the 
property purchased will be used in business, in which case it will 
318 Id. at 18. 
uo Id. 
120 State real property law would continue to apply to real estate transactions . 
.., BURTON & MAsTROMARCO No. 1, supra note 316, at 18-19. 
822 As described supra at note 320, the current real property recording system would be 
utilized to maintain records fothe credits, similar to other encumbrances on property which 
are also recorded in land records. See BURTON & MAsTROMARCO No. 1, supra note 316, at 
18-19 . 
... See id. 
824 See id. 
326 See BURTON & MAsTROMARCO, No. 2, supra note 316, at 1239. 
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not be subject to the retail sales tax, or whether it will be used for 
personal consumption, in which case it will be subject to the retail 
sales tax. 326 A similar issue arises with regard to the purchase of 
services. The NST proposal suggests a rule of thumb for mixed-use 
property, requiring that it be used more than 95% for exempt 
purposes before an exemption is allowed.327 
The issue is substantially less important under a VAT because 
the tax is paid at each stage of production. Therefore, no 
exemption from the tax should be available at any stage. 
4. Barter Transactions and the Underground Economy 
Barter transactions and the underground economy have been 
significant problems under the current income tax system. 328 
Barter takes place without any cash being transferred and, 
therefore, readily avoids detection by the revenue authorities. It 
is particularly troublesome with respect to services because the 
entire value of the property or services received in exchange for 
other services, which would ordinarily be included in income, can 
escape taxation. Similarly, transactions in the underground 
economy escape taxation because cash is used and, therefore, 
readily avoids detection. 
Similar problems arise and must be dealt with under the 
proposal to tax transactions at the point-of-sale. The magnitude 
of the problem, however, is likely to be less, both with respect to 
barter and the underground economy, particularly under a credit 
type VAT. First, one would expect that the tax rate imposed on a 
point-of-sale transaction would be lower than the tax rate imposed 
under the current income tax. As such, the amount of revenue lost 
to evasion would be smaller as well. 
Second, the loss of revenue is most serious when both sides of 
the barter transactions are ultimately used for consumption. To 
the extent that one side of the barter transaction is in the 
... Id. at 1246 . 
.... ld. 
328 See Burgess J. W. Raby & William L. Raby, Barter Transactions and the Tax Collector, 
77 TAX NOTES, 949 (1997). 
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production process, the purchaser of that side will not be entitled 
to a credit for any value-added tax, so the tax-free acquisition of 
services will ultimately be taxed upon resale of the finished 
product. While a similar situation occurs under the income tax in 
that the business taxpayer is not entitled to a deduction for 
bartered services, taxpayers may, in effect, obtain a deduction to 
the extent of their basis in the transferred property, particularly 
if the transferred property is reflected as goods sold since it is no 
longer in inventory. Further, under the income tax, there is no 
assurance that both sides of the barter transaction will be reported 
consistently, that is, there is no assurance that the failure to report 
a receipt in income will be offset by the inability of the other side 
to report a deduction. In contrast, under a VAT, the failure to 
report the transaction entirely would automatically affect both 
sides of the exchange in a consistent manner. 
Third, to the extent barter transactions require policing, there 
will be greater availability of resources to do the policing under 
point-of-sale taxation because of the significant savings from other 
aspects of the revenue system.329 Unreported income is currently, 
and is likely to continue to be, a problem under the income tax 
system· as long as it exists. 
Fourth, and most importantly, the replacement of currency 
transactions with electronic transactions will significantly reduce 
the loss of tax revenues from the underground economy. To the 
extent that substantial amounts of money pass, the money must be 
transferred electronically and tax will be assessed automatically. 
The remaining loss of revenue should be minor compared with the 
current income tax system. Although the problem will continue to 
exist for point-of-sale taxation barter transactions, the importance 
of these transactions, particularly for taxpayers who purchase for 
resale at retail, will not be very important. Even under the current 
income tax system, cash transactions represent a much greater 
share of the tax avoidance economy than pure barter transactions. 
120 Since the cost of administering the point-of-sale taxation would be significantly less 
than the current tax system, see supra notes 310-14 and accompanying text, resources 
would be freed up to address the issue of policing barter transactions. 
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A caveat, however, is in order here. To the extent that there 
is an expansion of the use of true "e-money",330 the accountability 
for the government of transactions that use "e-money" may become 
doubtful.331 Keeping track of these transactions in a manner 
sufficient to ensure proper collection of a point-of-sale tax would 
become correspondingly more troublesome. This situation would 
mirror the difficulties that the central bank money regulators 
would likely encounter if they sought to monitor the money supply 
and protect users of "e-money", as well as others affected by it, 
from potential financial melt-down in the event of a the failure of 
one or more issuers. 332 
On the other hand, at least for transactions that are not 
illegal, presumably major issuers of "e-money" will be generally 
known. 333 Otherwise the "e-money" would not be widely 
accepted.334 Thus, the taxing authorities should be able to identify 
issuers of "e-money" and force compliance, at least from domestic 
issuers. 
It is difficult to deal with and resolve potential tax issues 
involving "e-money" at this point, however, because "e-money" is 
currently more hypothetical than real. As a result, it is extremely 
difficult to foresee with any precision how regulators will make 
issuers of"e-money" accountable. Once that becomes clearer, there 
likely will be a means to ensure that "e-money" transactions will 
be traceable by taxing authorities. 
5. Gifts 
Cash gifts would also have to be made electronically. If gifts 
were excluded from the transaction tax base, then they would have 
030 That is, third party promises in the form of internet accounts whose balances have no 
counterpart in any deposits at a fmancial institution. See supra notes 32-33 and 
accompanying text. 
331 True e-money could be developed to protect the anonymity of its owner and not be 
traceable. This anonymous e-money would also make the owner's identity unavailable for 
the purposes of attaching tax liability. See supra notes 34-4 7 and accompanying text. 
032 See supra notes 330-31. If a central bank, such as the Federal Reserve Bank, would 
be unable to trace the path of e-money, then it follows that tax collection would experience 
the same difficulties utilizing similar technology. 
333 See SOLOMON, supra note 5, at 74-75 . 
... ld. 
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to be specially identified at the time of the transfer in order to 
avoid the automatic assessment. Unlike gifts currently, there 
would be a trail because of the required identification of the 
transfer as a gift. That would facilitate wealth transfer taxation, 
if the amounts are large, and audit, in the event that the 
government desired verification. 
6. Transitional Considerations 
There are many transitional issues in replacing the current 
income tax with consumption tax as the exclusive means of raising 
revenue. That is the case regardless of whether the consumption 
tax takes the form of a sales tax, VAT, Hall-Rabushka flat tax, or 
a cash flow consumed income tax. The automatic and electronic 
collection of a tax imposed at the time of the transaction should not 
add to the burdens of transition once the technology has been fully 
developed and, for most sizeable transactions, would require little 
more than the modification of software. 
F. PERSONALIZING THE TAX 
Personalizing the tax involves tailoring a taxpayer's tax 
liability on the basis of particular attributes of the taxpayer in 
order to achieve fairness, however that term is defined.335 If 
fairness requires that taxation be based upon ability to pay, then 
taking personal attributes of a taxpayer into account in assessing 
the tax ensures that distributional fairness can be achieved. The 
attributes that may be considered include marital status, number 
of dependants, hardships, such as medical expenses, and the 
amount of expenditures made in a tax-favored way, such as 
charitable contributions. Personalizing can also take into account 
some measure of the taxpayer's "ability to pay," based upon the 
... See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 4 7-83 for a general discussion of the different 
theoretical conceptions of fairness. Fairness in the personal income tax generally refers to 
taxation in accordance with ability to pay. Moreover, fairness requires horizontal equity, 
under which two people with equivalent incomes, after subtracting costs for producing that 
!ncome, should pay equivalent taxes. I d. at 52. 
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aggregate amount of the taxpayer's income, wealth, or 
consumption. 
1. _ Choosing the Legal Incidence of the Tax 
Imposing the legal incidence of the tax on the individual 
taxpayer facilitates the ability to personalize the tax so that it 
takes account of the personal circumstances of the taxpayer. The 
personal income tax, for example, takes account of the income 
recipient's marital status, number of children and other 
dependents, amount of current or potential consumption that the 
income recipient chooses to forego by giving money to charity, and 
homeowner status, for which the income recipient may be indebted 
and paying home mortgage interest. The current income tax 
system, which takes into account all of these personal attributes 
and many more in order to achieve fairness, requires that the legal 
incidence of the tax be placed on the income recipient. 336 
On the other hand, the personalizing of the income tax also 
adds substantial complexity to the revenue raising system and, 
therefore, to the inefficiency and dead-weight loss. If one viewed 
the ability to personalize the tax as more of a weakness than a 
strength of a tax system, then a tax on transactions such as a 
consumption tax in the form of a retail sales tax or value added tax 
could almost entirely avoid the temptation to personalize the tax. 
A tax that imposes the legal incidence on the income recipient, 
such as the Hall-Rabushka flat tax or the cash flow consumed 
income tax, would retain the flexibility, and, therefore, the 
temptation, to personalize the tax. 
Importantly, all attempts to personalize a tax will make it 
more difficult to collect the tax in a direct manner at the point-of-
sale. That is because the personalization of the tax, even if 
collected automatically at the point-of-sale, will require either an 
application for refund with supporting information, or a tax return 
accompanied by additional payment of the tax, and by appropriate 
evidence of the liability. Personalizing a tax, therefore, will involve 
administrative costs payable both at the government level and the 
* See I.R.C. § 1 
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income recipient level. It is possible that the dead-weight loss 
resulting from those costs will outweigh the fairness benefits of 
personalizing the tax. That would be particularly true when many 
of the desired aspects of the personalization can be done by means 
of direct grants from the government. For example, instead of 
personalizing the personal income tax by allowing a deduction for 
charitable contributions, the subsidy to charities can be 
accomplished through matching grants. 
Because of these administrative costs, the cash flow 
consumption tax is not readily susceptible to the proposal made in 
this paper and the benefits attendant to that proposal. In addition, 
like the current income tax, the cash flow consumption tax is 
susceptible to micro management and the inefficiencies and 
complexities resulting from that micromanagement. 337 It requires 
individuals to go through the annual ritual of completing a tax 
return and tracking receipts and expenditures. While the cash 
flow consumption tax changes the base from the current income 
tax system, and creates some simplification by virtue of being a 
consumption rather ·than an income tax, it is not readily 
susceptible to point-of-sale taxation. 
In contrast to the cash flow consumed income model, a VAT 
coupled with the Hall-Rabushka flat style tax on wage income 
entails less personalizing. It, therefore, is more readily susceptible 
to mechanical implementation. The tax can be assessed and 
collected largely at the point of transaction, particularly if the VAT 
credit to the selling firm can be subtracted electronically and 
automatically. Under the flat tax part of the plan, however, 
personalizing can take place as a part of the tax on employees' 
wages. 
331 The term "micromanagement" is generally used to refer to the situation where every 
little detail of what one does is essentially supervised by someone else in a painstaking 
intrusive and nonproductive manner. The current income tax system as well as the cash 
flow consumption tax involves a great deal ofmicromanagement by the government under 
the guise of "targeted tax incentives," a phrase used repeatedly, if not coined, by the 
Administration of President Clinton. See Heidi Glenn, Clinton May Offer Job-Creating and 
Homeowner Tax Incentives, 72 TAX NOTES 1103 (1996). 
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2. Progressivity in General 
The most important impediment to replacing the income tax 
involves the ability to personalize the income tax, and the most 
important aspect of personalizing the tax involves the issue of 
progressive taxation. 338 Proponents of the income tax as well as 
some forms of consumption tax consider this aspect of tax policy a 
precondition of fundamental tax reform and a necessary part of 
any replacement tax system. 339 Their arguments in favor of 
progressivity fall into four categories. 
First, taxation should be based upon "ability to pay." 340 
Higher income taxpayers have disproportionately greater 
discretionary income out of which they can pay tax, and are 
therefore better able to bear a disproportionately greater tax. 341 
Second, payments should be required in accordance with the 
benefits received by the taxpayer.342 Higher income taxpayers 
derive greater benefits from our economy and society, which 
facilitate the higher earning.343 
Third, taxation should require "equality of sacrifice. "344 
Proponents of progressive rates on this basis generally ground 
their position on the assertion that an extra dollar of accumulation 
is worth less to a rich person than a poor person.345 Accordingly, 
in order to achieve equal sacrifice, one must tax high income 
108 For a general discussion of the arguments dealing with progressivity, see Walter J. 
Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 
417 (1952). See also Walter J. Blum, Revisiting the Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 
60 TAXES 16 (1982); Boris I. Bittk.er, Second Lecture in Debate with Charles 0. Galvin, in 
TAXPOUCY: READINGS AND MATERIALS 123 (Philip D. Oliver & Fred W. Peel, Jr. eds. 1996). 
aaa Id. See also MORRIS, supra note 132, at 173; GILLIS ET AL., supra note 214 at 735; Anne 
L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case Against Income and Wealth Transfer Taxation: a 
Response to Professor McCaffery, 51 T AXLA W REV. 363, 368 (1996)(arguing that the current 
consumption tax theorists are hiding the lack ofprogressivity in their proposals). See also 
generally MCMAHON & ABREU, supra note 128; BANKMAN & GRIFFITH, supra note 120. 
140 See WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE 
TAXATION 64 (1953) . 
.. , See id. at 35-39. 
142 See id. 
... See id. at 64 . 
... See id. at 39-45, 70-71. 
... See id. at 40. 
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taxpayers at a disproportionately higher rate than lower income 
taxpayers. 346 
Fourth, a system of taxation should reduce inequality of 
wealth. 347 Progression accomplishes this objective. 348 If one 
accepts the proposition that income and wealth distribution should 
be more equal than what would occur in a free market, then the 
issue becomes how best to accomplish the redistribution. A free 
market, without a means of redistribution of its rewards, would 
generate economic inequality.349 This inequality can be corrected 
more efficiently through the tax system by means of progressive 
rates than by intervention in the goods and services markets. 350 To 
be sure, some efficiency must be sacrificed to achieve more 
economic equality through tax policy, but a trade-off of this type 
may be acceptable in order to achieve the important objective of 
reducing economic inequality. 
The arguments for progressivity can all be viewed as different 
aspects of an argument based upon the notion of fairness. 351 
Therefore, if a principal goal of the tax system is to collect revenue 
in a fair and equitable manner, the argument goes, progressivity 
should be an essential part of that revenue raising system. 352 As 
a result, the argument follows, no system of taxation, whatever its 
merits, should be adopted to replace the income tax unless it can 
be made progressive and thereby allow for the collection of taxes 
disproportionately from taxpayers in accordance with their 
aggregate amount of income, 353 even if the tax base is consumption. 
Under this view, consumption taxes are inherently regressive 
when evaluated using the standard of income.354 That is, a 
consumption tax will tax a smaller proportion of a taxpayer's 
... Seeid . 
.. 
7 See id. at 55, 70-80 (1953). 
... See id. at 71. 
... See id. at 80-81. 
... See id. at 84. 
101 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 83. 
102 See BLUM & KALVEN, JR., supra note 340, at 104. 
... See Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961, 1016 
(1992); AsToTr, supra note 339, at 364-66; BLUM & KALVEN, JR., supra note 340, at 104 . 
... ld. 
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income than even a proportionate income tax would. 355 This 
position is based on the legal incidence of the consumption tax. 356 
The economic incidence is much more uncertain. Further, it is 
tempered by the possibility of a steeply graduated consumption 
tax. If even a graduated consumption tax would be unacceptably 
regressive, a flat rate consumption tax such as a single rate VAT 
would be even more objectionable.357 
Advocates of a flat rate tax system, whether based on income 
or consumption, argue that fairness is achieved through a single 
flat rate, although most would concede that at a low level of income 
or consumption, no tax should be collected at all. 358 Thus, a single 
rate system with a zero bracket amount achieves that fairness. 359 
Moreover, some flat rate tax advocates urge that a system that 
incorporates a zero bracket amount and generous standard 
deductions is progressive on the basis of average tax rates, 
although the marginal tax rate for all taxpayers subject to any rate 
of tax is the same. 360 
Advocates of a flat rate system further argue against 
progressivity on the basis of the negative consequences attendant 
to a steeply graduated system.361 They argue that graduation 
depresses savings and investment, resulting in a smaller 
accumulation of capital and slower growth than would otherwise 
occur.362 Graduated rates, it is further argued, stifle 
entrepreneurial risk because gains are taxed at a high bracket, 
whereas losses offset other income taxed in a lower bracket.363 In 
... See BLUM & KALVEN, JR., supra note 340, at 94-95. 
0156 Id. at 96-99; RoSEN, supra note 52, at 362 . 
.. , See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 232 (concluding that the VAT shifts more of 
the tax burden onto the working poor). A single rate VAT would be inherently regressive 
because the amount of the tax paid is not related to ability to pay. See supra notes 224-44 
and accompanying text, describing the implementation of a VAT. 
0156 See HALL&RABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 26; MOORE, supra note 218, at 117; SCHENK, 
Value Added Tax, supra note 225, at 240 . 
... Id. 
'"" See RoBERT E. HALLET. AL.,FAIRNESSANDEmCIENCYINTHEFLATTAX28-29 (1996); 
BLUM & KALVEN, JR., supra note 340, at 90-94. 
381 See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 24. 
382 See BLUM& KALVEN,JR., supra note 340 at 36 -37; Federico, supra note 132, at 362-65. 
383 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 116. 
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addition, high rates of tax create disincentives to work, causing 
taxpayers to trade work for more leisure. 364 To the extent that 
rates are graduated, the highest marginal rate of tax would be 
higher than a tax system containing uniform rates. 365 The 
disincentive towards work would be most noticeable and egregious 
in the case of married couples. 366 Other arguments are also made 
against progression, including its connection to high rates of tax, 
resulting in the inability of individuals to accumulate wealth and 
avoid the feeling of stagnation, and the effect of high rates on an 
increase in the incentives for cheating. 367 
No attempt can be made here to resolve the debate over 
progressivity. That is particularly the case because the arguments 
focus on the legal incidence of tax instead of the economic 
incidence, which is far more important but also far more difficult 
to determine. However, certain observations can be made that will 
be helpful in understanding the real trade-off involved in accepting 
progressivity as an essential part of the tax system. First, it is not 
necessary that all parts of the system of government taxation and 
spending, which involves both taxation and government transfer 
payments, be progressive. If one wanted to achieve a more equal 
society, one could accomplish that through a flat rate tax system 
with direct government expenditures disproportionately spent to 
benefit the less well off. This is the method employed in the Social 
Security system. The Social Security tax is essentially flat, but the 
retirement and insurance benefits to participants in the system go 
disproportionately to lower income participants. Eliminating the 
Social Security tax for lower wage employees would also achieve a 
greater degree of overall progressivity.368 
Second, the desirability of reducing income inequality through 
the tax system must be weighed against the benefits to be achieved 
... See supra notes 117-30 and accompanying text. 
... See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 180. 
,.. See, e.g. GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX, supra note 4, at 29-40 (discussing the 
"marriage penalty" where a married couple is taxed on their aggregate income at a higher 
marginal rate than two single people.) 
187 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 143-52. 
... Eliminating the Social Security tax for low wage employees would integrate the income 
tax and the Social Security tax and thereby increase the redistributional effects of the 
combined income tax and Social Security tax systems. 
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by reducing costs of the tax collection system. This weighing must 
also take into account the possibility of achieving reduced 
inequality by some other means. Most of the debate over 
progressivity has taken place in the context of an income tax, so 
administrative cost savings attendant to adopting a flat rate 
system have been regarded as relatively minor when compared 
with the goals advocates of progression desire to achieve. 369 When 
one expands the possibilities of revenue raising systems to include 
a system that is substantially less expensive to administer if 
operated using a flat rate of tax, then the arguments for and 
against progressivity must be re-evaluated in that broader context. 
Third, advocates of a progressive tax view the income tax as 
the best method of taxation to achieve progressivity and, therefore, 
fairness.370 Nonetheless, on close examination of the current 
structure of the income tax, it should be observed that there is a 
distinct lack of progressivity at the higher end of income, when 
measured against the Haig-Simons definition of personal 
income.371 That is because the current income tax system fails to 
tax income in the form of unrealized appreciation, a benefit likely 
to be enjoyed most by the well off. This benefit, although generally 
in the nature of deferral, entails complete forgiveness of tax on 
gain in the case of a taxpayer who dies with the appreciated 
property. 372 In addition, the current structure of the income tax 
does not tax imputed income from property, services, or leisure. 
Finally, it fails to tax currently all income accruing in a qualified 
retirement account, whether in the form of interest, dividends, or 
capital gain, allowing deferral until the amounts are paid out to 
the beneficiary. These departures from a Haig-Simons income tax 
structure are likely to be unavoidable under any income tax that 
could be employed. It is not likely that any income tax system that 
is reasonably administrable could tax imputed income or 
. unrealized gain. In addition, it is unlikely that Congress in the 
..., See supra notes 338-55 and accompanying text. 
170 See, e.g. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 233; GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX, supra 
note 4, at 275; Alstott, supra note 339, at 367-68. 
171 See ANDREWS, supra note 2, at 1115 (no tax on appreciation until realization). 
372 See I.R.C. § 1014 (a). 
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foreseeable future will have the desire to tax qualified retirement 
savings as they accrue. 
3. Progressivity and Point-of-Sale Taxation 
To the extent that progressivity is desirable, there are several 
altematives available to accomplish some degree of progressivity 
under single rate point-of-sale taxation. Progressivity could be 
accomplished through a VAT system by shifting the legal incidence 
of the tax on personal service income to the service provider. As 
described earlier, a VAT could be charged on amounts paid for the 
services of employees, which would in tum generate a VAT credit 
to the employer purchasing the services. 373 At the employee level, 
low wage earners could receive a refund of a portion of the VAT 
paid. Thus, the personalizing features could be applied at the 
individual wage earner level. 
To the extent the taxes are personalized, however, 
computation and payment would become mechanically more 
cumbersome, requiring reconciliation between the amounts paid 
automatically and the actual amount of tax due. The reconciliation 
. of these amounts may also have to take into account the gross-up 
resulting from the inclusion in the employee's income of the 
automatically paid tax for purposes of determining the employee's 
tax liability. Personalized taxes would diverge from the model of 
automatic and electronic tax computation and collection, thereby 
adding expense to the tax system. If modification of a pure point-
of-sale tax were desired, the system at least has semi-automatic 
aspects. This trade-off, however, should be given careful 
consideration before being accepted. 
This system lends itself to electronic payments. At the 
individual level, a system of direct deposit for wages would 
facilitate the electronic crediting to the low wage employee for the 
VAT paid by the business with respect to the wages. The VAT 
refund to the employee with respect to personal service income 
could be based on a low income amount. An employee's wages from 
.,. See supra, notes 232-44 and accompanying text. 
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all employers would have to be aggregated for these purposes. This 
system would be similar to that advocated by Hall and Rabushk.a. 
Even with this modification, however, proponents of 
progressivity may argue that automatic taxation at the point-of-
sale is regressive because it only taxes consumption, not savings, 
and is not progressive at high income levels. In addition, they 
would argue, automatic point-of-sale taxation, whether 
administered as a retail sales tax or a VAT, is the most regressive 
consumption tax because it imposes a flat rate of tax on all sales. 
As has been noted previously, point-of-sale taxation can also 
be achieved under an income VAT.374 Thus, whether point-of-sale 
taxation is regressive depends more upon the tax base used than 
upon the method of collection. However, it is unclear that a 
consumption tax is more regressive than an income tax when 
measured by the economic incidence of the tax. 
In addition, the retail sales tax and VAT can employ multiple 
rates of tax. At the extreme they can impose a low tax on food and 
clothing or exclude such purchases from the base entirely. 
However, even under an electronic system, such a modification 
would increase compliance costs and loss of revenue through 
cheating by mislabeling the goods sold as no tax or low tax goods. 
Consequently, as demonstrated by the European experience, a 
multiple rate system should be avoided. 
Finally, a degree ofprogressivity could be worked into a sales 
tax or VAT in three other ways, all involving government 
expenditures, without disturbing the point-of-sale collection 
systems or the single rate of tax. First, the government, which can 
keep track electronically of aggregate tax collections from each 
individual, could refund the tax on the first predetermined amount 
of purchases, for example the first $20,000. Second, the 
government could simply refund a flat amount to all taxpayers 
equal to the VAT on that $20,000 of purchases. Third, the 
government could refund an amount equal to the sales tax rate 
times the poverty level through a "family consumption refund" 
174 See supra Part VI. B. 
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established for each household. 375 The exact amount of the family 
consumption refund would depend upon the size of the family. All 
of these methods could determine the refunded amount on an 
annualized basis. Allowable refunds could be made for households 
on a periodic basis by requiring the employer to add an additional 
amount to the paycheck of the employee. This amount would offset 
the employer's other tax obligations to the government. In the case 
of unemployed taxpayers, refunds could be made through direct 
government rebates, which could be accomplished by creating 
credit balances on a debit card. 
It should be noted that a refund based upon a taxpayer's 
income would require computation of that income and would 
thereby be counterproductive in a system designed to eliminate the 
need for such a computation.376 Such a refund, however, could be 
based on the level of a taxpayer's earned income that is subject to 
social security tax, which would still be computed by employers 
and self employed taxpayers. The point here is that this tax 
refund mechanism, which is really a mechanism for government 
expenditures, demonstrates that taxes and spending should be 
considered together in evaluating wealth redistribution. Indeed, 
net of interest on the national debt, transfer payments currently 
represent the bulk of government spending.377 In addition, many 
of the recent tax reductions that have been labeled "targeted tax 
cuts" are disguised expenditure programs and included as "tax 
expenditures" in the government's tax expenditure budget.378 
Detractors of the progressive retail sales tax and VAT might 
fear the specter of checks flowing in many directions as a potential 
source of significant leakage and waste. When accomplished 
electronically, however, the cost of these payments and the 
170 A similar idea is discussed in SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 220 (creation of 
"income maintenance programs to offset the impact of a VAT, or perhaps a new universal 
tax credit paid to all individuals and families"). See also GILLIS ET AL., supra note 214, at 
736-738, (rebate or refund ofV AT would be paid to qualifying individuals to relieve the tax 
burden on the poor). 
378 See SCHENK, Value Added Tax, supra note225, at, 270. 
371 See Michael Boskin, A Framework for the Tax Reform Debate, in FRONTIERS OF TAX 
REFORM 10, 11, (Michael Boskin ed. 1996). 
378 Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform in TAXPOUCY 507, 509(Philip D. Oliver 
& Fred W. Peel, eds. 1996) (describing the federal tax expenditure budget). 
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opportunities for diversion should be reduced significantly. What 
seems infeasible in a paper and currency economy becomes 
substantially more feasible in an electronic economy. 
Finally, progressivity can be achieved without burdening the 
tax collection system with the need to measure income by imposing 
the VAT on lifetime gifts and testamentary transfers. This system 
would tax wealth transfers, would deal with large accumulations 
of wealth, and would introduce long term progressivity. 
Alternatively, the current estate and gift tax system could be 
adjusted and modified to accomplish this goal more efficiently.379 
On balance, any position that exalts progressivity over all 
other objectives of a tax system is somewhat hypocritical, because 
true progressivity has not been and is unlikely to be achieved in 
the personal income tax.380 Progressivity itself should not be the 
goal. Rather, it should be a means to achieve a distribution of 
benefits from society for its members, and, there are alternative 
means available to accomplish that ultimate goal. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This article has advocated point-of-sale taxation as the most 
efficient and least costly means of collecting tax in an economy in 
which electronic funds transfers, credit and debit card 
transactions, and "e-money" will eventually become the standard 
method of making purchases and transferring funds. The point-of-
sale tax system proposed in this paper would use a consumption 
base and would replace the income tax even if some transactions 
were still undertaken using cash. 
A major objection to the point-of-sale taxation proposal 
suggested in this paper will be the presumed inability to 
personalize the tax so as to impose the burden, at least in large 
part, based upon ability to pay. In short, detractors of a 
transactions based tax will argue that the proposed system is 
regressive and therefore unacceptable. In theory, either a credit 
.,. MichaelJ. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not To Bury It in TAXPOUCY 465,470-71 
(Philip D. Oliver & Fred W. Peel, eds. 1996) (advocating increased use of transfer taxes for 
enhanced progressity). 
180 See supra note 371 and accompanying text. 
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type VAT or a retail sales tax can be coupled with a tax on personal 
service income to achieve a compromise, as long as the tax on 
personal service income is simple. Coupling the VAT with a tax on 
personal service income facilitates personalizing the tax with 
special aspects such as progressivity. Point-of-sale taxation, 
without the personalizing facilitated by an accompanying tax on 
personal service income, however, can accomplish substantially all 
of the desirable goals of the present income tax system. Adding an 
income tax component could substantially undercut the benefits of 
the transaction based tax, depending upon the degree to which the 
tax is personalized or used to accomplish other social objectives. 
Personalizing involves adopting an additional tax collection 
apparatus. It involves substantial cost and deadweight loss. 
Adherence to a personalized tax at the cost of this deadweight loss 
is an undesirable choice in the face of the uncertainty regarding 
the economic incidence of any tax. The non-susceptibility of point-
of-sale taxation to personalization is a strength of the system, not 
a weakness and argues in favor of its adoption. Wealth 
redistribution, if desired, can be accomplished better and more 
efficiently in ways other than through individual computation of 
tax liability. 
Fundamental tax reform is a concept that has a long gestation 
period. The U.S. economy is becoming largely based on electronic 
payments, and it is time to consider seriously an appropriate tax 
system for that form of economy. As e-commerce replaces cash 
transactions, point-of-sale taxation, in the manner described in 
this paper, should replace the current income tax system. 
